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ABSTRACT
The Cyprus Problem has been on the international agenda for more than four decades. 
Cyprus is a well-studied issue of International Relations. Yet the island's geo-strategic 
importance, the fact of a multitude of actors involved and external factors which stem 
from the nature of the international political system have prevented an impartial 
assessment of the Cyprus Problem. Most significantly, the issue of writing a 
commonly acceptable history of the problem and understanding the mutual 
perceptions involved has largely been tainted with political motives. The issue of 
mutual perceptions, how they were formed and developed is of crucial importance on 
the road to a solution to the problem. A pre-condition for overcoming the current 
stalemate in Cyprus requires a thorough understanding of the island's history and the 
mutual perceptions both in Cyprus and in the two mother countries. This thesis 
attempts to illustrate the historical sources and origins of current self-perceptions and 
perceptions of the other side. It also tries to demonstrate that one of the'key factors in 
a future solution to the Cyprus problem lies in the eventual comprehension of both 
sides' perceptions of events in the past and present.
ÖZET
Kıbns Sorunu kırk yıldır uluslararası camianın gündeminde yer almaktadır. Kıbns 
uluslararası ilişkiler alamnda oldukça çok işlenmiş bir konudur. Ne var ki, adamn jeo- 
stratejik konumu, çok sayıda aktörün soruna taraf olması ve uluslararası siyasal 
sistemin doğası gibi dış faktörler sorunun genel kabul gören bir çerçevede 
değerlendirilmesine engel olmuştur. En önemlisi, Kıbns Sorununun taraflarca kabul 
görebilecek bir tarihinin yazılması ve ve karşılıklı algılamalarm anlaşılabilmesi ne 
yazık ki siyasi mülahazalarm gölgesinden kurtanlamamamıştiT'.-'Karşılıklı algılamalar 
konusu, bu algılamalann nasıl oluştuğu, nasıl geliştiği sorunun çözülmesi yolunda 
oldukça önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Kıbns'ta mevcut tıkanıklığm aşılması için ön 
şart adamn tarihinin iyi anlaşılması ve hem Kıbns'ta hem de Yunanistan ve 
Türkiye'deki karşılıklı algılamalann doğru değerlendirilmesidir. Bu tez çalışması 
taraflarm kendilerini ve karşı tarafı nasıl algıladıklarmın tarihsel kaynaklarım ve 
kökenlerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışma Kıbns 
Sorununun gelecekteki bir çözümünün temeliude her iki tarafin da geçmişteki ve 
günümüzdeki olaylan karşı tarafın nasıl algıladığım anlamaktan geçtiğini iddia 
etmektedir. --------
This dissertation owes its greatest debt to Assist. Prof. Hasan Ünal and Prof. Norman 
Stone. I am indebted to both of them for encouraging and supporting me throughout 
this endeavor. Also, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my wife Ayşegül 
for her boundless patience.
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NOTE ON THE TURKISH ALPHABET AND NAMES
Throughout this paper modem Turkish orthography has been used in transcribing 
Turkish names and place names excq)t when quoting from non-Turkish sources; for 
example Istanbul and not Constantinople unless the context referred to the ancient 
period. The pronunciation of the following Turkish letters used in this paper should be 
noted:
c - j as in jam 
9 - ch as in church
Ö - French eu as in deux or seul, or Gennan ö as in öfßien 
Ü - French u as in l\imiere, or German ü as in schützen 
§ - sh as in shelf 
1 - i as in cousin
g - is silent in standard Turkish, serving only to lengthen a preceding vowel
MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
Maps
Map LI. C3q>ras in the Eastern Mediterranean P-4
Map I.II. Cypms After the Turkish Intervention in 1974 p. 28
Map LIII. Mara§A^arosha p. 31
Charts
Chart LI. Chronological Chart of the Cypms Problem p. 35
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
OZET
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
NOTE ON THE TURKISH ALPHABET AND NAMES 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
11
111
IV
V
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.1. Ottoman Turkish Rule in Cyprus (1571-1878)
1.2. The Greek War of Independence and the Importation of Irredentism
1.3. Cyprus Under British Rule (1878-1960)
1.4. The Growth of the Enosis Movement
1.5. Enosis
1.6. The Turkish Community
1.7. Political Violence: Prelude to Independence
1.8. The Republic: An Artificial Creation
1.9. Civil War (1964-1974)
1.10.1974: The Turkish Intervention
1.11. Post-Intervention Developments and Negotiations
3
6
7
9
10
13
14 
19 
23
25
26
CHAPTER II: MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS AND SELF-PERCEPTIONS
2.1. THE GREEKS (The Macro Picture)
2.1.1. Historical Linearity - Invaders firom the East
36
37 
37
2.1.2. Byzantium: Oriental Traits of National Identity
2.1.3. The Role of the Orthodox Church: Depository of History
2.1.4. Turkokratia - The Source of All Sius
2.1.5. Megali Idea - A Not So Great Idea
2.2. The Micro Level
2.2. \. Enosis
2.2.2. Inability to Come to Grips With Reality
2.2.3. Turkish Intervention: The Calamity
2.2.4. Current Features
41
43
44
46
46
48
50
51
39
2.3. THE TURKS (The Macro Picture) 54
2.3.1. Turks in History and the Ottoman Turks: Suppression of Identity 54
2.3.2. The Ottoman Experience 56
2.3.3. Greek Treachery and the Sèvres Syndrome 58
2.4. The Micro Level 61
2.4.1. Turks in Cyprus 61
2.4.2. The Rise of Greek Nationalism: Evolution Toward Separateness 62
2.4.3. Changing Allegiances and Redefinition of Identity 63
2.4.4. Turkish Cypriot Construction of Reactionary Nationalism 64
2.4.5. Fear - Suppression - Humility 66
2.4.6.1974: Intervention and the Beginning of a New Form of Existence 68
2.4.7. Current Features 69
CHAPTER ni: CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
73
76
VI
INTRODUCTION
This study was initially inspired by a special interest in an overall presentation of the 
Cyprus Problem. It was planned to provide a detailed historical account, a thorough 
examination of mutual perceptions and an issue-based presentation of the political by­
play. However, as the study progressed and the extent of both the historical background 
of the issue and the mutual perceptions involved were revealed, it became clearer that it 
was more appropriate to concentrate on the first two dimensions and leave the political 
by-play out of the scope of this thesis.
This thesis is composed of two main parts that assume equal significance with respect to 
the presentation of the subject matter. The first part is a detailed historical account which 
attempts to provide iasight to the origins and development of the Cyprus Problem. The 
Ottoman conquest of Cyprus is taken as a starting point in the history of the Cyprus 
Problem. Although, Cyprus was dominated by other powers prior to the Ottoman 
conquest, the history of what is today referred to as the Cyprus Problem was a 
consequence of the Ottoman conquest of the island. In this section main lines of the 
history of Cyprus were charted out and events that marked lasting change and significant 
realignment were emphasized. In order to provide an overview to the chronology of 
events in Cyprus a “Chronological Chart” has been added with a view to compliment the 
preceding section.
The second part of this thesis deals with the mutual perceptions involved. The analysis 
was subcategorized into two levels, first mutual perceptions in Greece and Turkey were
1
examiaed, then mutual perceptions on the island were illustrated. The author adopted a 
historicahchronological approach to the examination of the two sides’ mutual 
perceptions. Thus the thesis identified the background of former perceptions and 
provided a chronological flow and development of the shaping of self-perceptions and 
perceptions about the other side. The choice of a chronological presentation was made 
with the view to draw attention to the linearity and genuine relationship between the 
image and perception of the past and the present.
Finally, a third chapter which summarised and concluded points presented in the thesis 
follows. In this chapter the significance of comprehending the history of Cyprus and 
understanding the mutual perceptions involved in any initiative or effort to find a solution 
to the Cyprus Problem was stressed.
In conclusion, it is only fair to add that; “in omni enim arte vel studio vel quavis, ut in 
ipsa virtute, optimum quidque rarissimum.”
(In every art or science, or branch of learning, as in virtue itself, perfection is but rarely 
attained.)”
Cicero. De Finibus, II, 25, 81.
CHAPTER I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The following historical background charts out main lines of the history of Cyprus and 
includes only those events that marked a lasting change and significant realignment. 
The history of Cyprus has been long, complex, and characterised by conflict but the 
scope of this paper does not permit for a detailed coverage of these events, other than 
highlights only.
1.1. Ottoman Turkish Rule in Cyprus: (1571-1878)
The Turkish forces landed at Salines near Lamaca on 3 July [1570] 
■without meeting any opposition. Though the defence forces o f the 
island were few the decision not to oppose the landing was, 
strategically, an error. A  great opportunity was lost, and once the 
horse, the cannon and the military baggage were safely ashore, any 
encounter -with the Turkish host in  open battle would have been 
suicidal.*
[Doros Alostos, Cyprus in History]
Located in the eastern comer of the Mediterranean, Cypms is effectively at the 
crossroads of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. The island, the third largest in 
the Mediterranean, has an area of 9,251 sq km and its closest point to the Anatolian 
landmass is 71 km away. Cypras is 98 km away from Syria and is more than 500 km 
away from Greece (See Map I.I). These geographic characteristics - small size, 
territorial status, and location - have presumably influenced the island’s long history 
and, subsequently might have determined its fate.^
Turkish involvement in Cypms began with the Ottoman campaign of 1570, ordered by 
Selim n, who aimed at safeguarding the political and territorial interests of the empire
’ Doros Alostos, Cyprus in History (London; Zenon Booksellers & Publishers, 1976) p. 242
in the Levant. Also, the Ottomans were quite annoyed by the Venetian harassment of 
Turkish ships and the use of Cyprus harbour by Maltese pirates who raided and 
molested Muslim ships in the Mediterranean.^ Prior to the Ottoman campaign the 
Island was governed by the Venetians who were the latest in line in the succession of 
conquerors of Cyprus. Indeed, Venetian rule was far from anjdhing pleasant for the 
population of Cyprus. Hence, the Greek Cypriots at first welcomed the arrival of the 
Ottoman Turks. Not ia vain. “The Latin clergy were expelled, their cathedrals turned
Map LI. Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean
into mosques. Serfdom was abolished”.''^  Cypriots were allowed to acquire houses and 
land. The Ottomans recognised the supremacy of the Orthodox community over all
 ^ Demetrios A. Theophylactou, Security, Identity and Nation Building (Aldershot, UK: Avebury Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 1995) p. 9
 ^Halil Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus - The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on A State (Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 1978) p. 4
Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978) p. 20
other Christian denominations and restored the Orthodox archbishopric/ The 
archbishop was thus was recognised as ethnarch, namely leader in both religious and 
temporal affairs.
In contemporary terms, the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571 actually meant a 
progressive step forward for the inhabitants of the island as the policy of istimalet,^ 
namely leniency toward the Cypriots and the implementation of the millet system 
translated into unparallel freedoms for religious minorities enjoyed anywhere in 
Europe.^ As for the Greek population, it greeted the Turks as liberators and was treated 
with consideration in return. Similar to what happened more than a century ago in 
Constantinople the inhabitants of Cyprus preferred Ottoman rule to what Cypriot 
historians dubbed as the “tyrannical” Latins.
Following the conquest of Cyprus the Ottomans ordered the migration of 5720 
families by means of sürgün (a population transplant aimed at increasing the 
productivity and loyalty of a given Ottoman region) from Anatolia to Cyprus. Some 
20,000 of the forces which conquered Cyprus were allowed to stay as well.
“As a result of these population transfers, Turks from a wide variety of 
professional backgrounds made then: way to the island. In this respect, the process 
of colonization carried out by the Turks in Cyprus was similar to that of the 
British in North America. But an important difference was that the Turks made a 
wholehearted effort to integrate the local inhabitants into the economic and
 ^ Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais - The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus (Boulder; CO: 
Columbia University Press, 1982) p. 3
 ^ For more detailed information about Ottoman rule see Halil İnalcık, Ottoman Policy and Administration in 
Cyprus After the Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969)
’ Oberling (1982) p. 4. The millet-system was based on the Ottoman system of administration, which categorized 
each community according to its religious denomination. Each community was represented in Istanbul and was 
largely free to exercise its religious and cultural customs on the condition that they paid their taxes.
political life of the Ottoman Empire while aUowing them to retain their own 
social institutions and cultural identity”.*
It is the descendants of these people which today constitute the Turkish Cypriot people
in Cyprus.^
“The Turkish connection with Cyprus lasted for some four centuries and reached 
back nearly as far as tbe beginning of European colonisation of the Americas and 
far longer than the whole history of the United States. Other alien regimes - 
Lusignan, Genoese, Venetian - had come and gone without impinging deeply on 
the Greek character of the Island...but the Turkish occupation was different; it 
lasted longer and had an abiding effect on the demographic and ethnic character 
ofCyprus”.*“
1.2. The Greek War of Independence and the Importation of Irredentism
The Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities lived in peace for more than three 
hundred years during Ottoman rule, finding at times common ground in their joint 
hostility to the harsh taxation imposed by the Sultan.^  ^ Crawshaw (1982) cautions 
about the need to put inter-communal relations “in perspective” and bases this, 
harmony upon the fact that Greeks were then the subject people and the Turkish 
Cypriots, although numerically inferior, had little to fear as long as Cyprus belonged to 
the Empire. Indeed, until the Greek War of Independence relations remained cordial 
between the two communities. The situation changed with the Greek War of
* Ibid, p. 7
’ It should be noted that most Greek sources interpret Ottoman Turkish rule from a negative viewpoint. These 
sources usually focus on the latter period of Ottoman rule and discount the relative progression the Ottomans 
brought to Cyprus in the 16th century. Their terminology, unfortunately far from historical impartiality, is decorated 
with expressions such “the tyrannical rule of the Turks”, “colonization”, ‘hisurpation and rape of Cyprus” or 
“Turkish yoke” etc. The progressive aspects of Ottoman rule are either brushed over or totally ignored. For such a 
biased interpretation see John Koumoulides, Cyprus & the War of Greek Independence 1821 - 1829 (London: 
Billing & Sons Ltd., 1974)
John Reddaway, Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection (London: K. Rüstern & Bro. And 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson Ltd., 1986) p. 8 
Crawshaw (1978) p. 20 
Ibid
Independence. As early as 1821 the Greek revolutionaries had sent missionaries to 
Cyprus to organize the Greek-speaking Cypriots into a national imit, to give them 
Greek culture and to promote the union of Cyprus with Greece when the time came.*^
In 1814, the Philike Hetaeria (Society of Friends), a secret political organisation was 
set up with the blessing of the Russians. It aimed at the establishment of a greater 
Greece which included Cyprus. Greek Cypriots supported the 1821 Greek uprising 
with money and volunteers. The Pan-Hellenic vision of the Megali Idea - the “doctrine 
of Greek irredentism whereby all the lands of Classical and Byzantine Hellenism 
should be reclaimed for the reborn nation - had drawn wide appeal within the Greek 
Cypriot elite and brought about the deterioration of iater-communal relations. Greek- 
Turkish relations dramatically deteriorated with the success of the Greek War of 
Independence in 1830. The appeal to the Megali Idea and enosis (Union with Greece) 
were alarming for the Turkish authorities. As a result, Turkish rule in the island 
became more repressive. The Turkish authorities became suspicious of the Greek 
Cypriot archbishopric’s activities and eventually publicly executed the Archbishop of 
Cyprus and other leadiag Christians in 1821.
Nevertheless, the Ottoman Turks administered the island until they were forced to 
agree to cede it - although temporarily - to Great Britain at the Congress of Berlin in 
1878. 308 years of Turkish rule came to an end, albeit with an Ottoman understanding
Salahi Sonyel, The Turco-Greek Conflict (Lefkoşa; Ulus Ofset, 1985) p. 69
This description was boirowed from Vamik D. Volkan & Norman Itzkowitz Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in 
Conflict (Huntingdon, UK: The Eothen Press, 1994) p, 37. For another, more comprehensive description of the 
term Megali Idea see the usage of Andreas C. Michalopoulos in Sonyel (1985). The Megali Idea is the “hope that 
some future day all the Hellenes will unite and the Greek Kingdom will extend from Ionia (Western Anatolia) to the 
Black Sea and include Thrace, the coastlands of Asia Minor and Constantinople (Istanbul). This is not an arrogant 
intellectual fancy, not a dream, not a wild ideal to resuscitate the Byzantine Empire, but the voice of the people 
determined to be free from a foreign race...” Sonyel (1985) p. 2
that this was a temporary arrangement, an understanding which they would find out to 
be misleading.
13. Cyprus Under British Rule (1878 -1960)
Britain’s interest in Cyprus was purely of a strategic nature. Britain, under Pronier 
Disraeli in 1874, was very concerned about Russian imperial expansion in the Balkans, 
as well as the safeguarding of the routes to her empire iu Asia. Disraeli was convinced 
that Cyprus would constitute a critical base for the protection of the route to India. 
Britain applied pressure to the Ottomans. Unable to deal with internal dissent and 
external pressure by the big powers the Ottomans concluded the “Cyprus Convention” 
with Great Britain.
The cessation of the Ionian Islands in 1864 was seized upon by the Greek Cypriots as a 
precedent for similar action by Britain in Cyprus.^ ® Hence, the Greek Cypriots, by then 
constituting two thirds of the population, welcomed British rule and expressed their 
desire for enosis. The bishop of Kition welcomed then the British governor with the 
following words:
‘W e  accept the change o f Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will 
help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which 
it is naturally connected.”
With the outbreak of WW I, Britain and the Ottoman Empire found themselves on 
opposing sides. Seizing upon this opportunity Britain announced unilaterally that it
According to the Cyprus Convention of 4 June 1878 Great Britain was given the administration of the island 
while sovereignty rested with the Ottoman Empire. It was agreed that if Russia restored Kars and other conquests 
made by it in Armenia during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 to the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus would be evacuated 
by Great Britain and the convention annulled.
Crawshaw (1978) p. 23
annulled the 1878 Convention and annexed the island in November 1914. The 
Ottomans did not accept the annexation but were unable to intervene at the time. In 
1915, Great Britain offered to cede Cyprus to Greece, on condition that Greece would 
enter the war on the side of Serbia against Bulgaria. Greece chose to stay neutral and 
the offer was retracted. The Ottoman Empire did not accept the aimexation until the 
Lausanne Treaty of 1923.
In other words, when the British took over the island in 1878, “the bicommxmal 
character of the Cypriots society had already been formed and consolidated”.^ * The 
first serious upheaval under British administration occurred in 1931 when deteriorating 
economic conditions combined with political protest and transformed into calls for 
enosis}'^ The British intervened and subdued the rioters. The Greek consul - a fanatic 
enosist - was declared persona non grata and was subsequently withdrawn by Athens, 
many agitators were expelled and the constitution was suspended. The British reverted 
to rule by decree and applied stringent press and anti-sedition laws.^°
1.4. The Growth of the Enosis Movement
The period of 1940-1950 was marked by the growth of the enosist movement. 
Throughout the decade Greek Cypriots lobbied the British for enosis and with the help 
of philhellenes in Britain, the idea was entertained in London as well. Yet, these efforts 
did not produce tangible results. With the end of W W II, the Greek Cypriots renewed 
their drive for enosis, but Britain which appreciated the island’s strategic value against
Salih (1978) p. 5 
Theophylactou (1995) p. 78
Oberiing (1982) describes the period of 1920-30 as Cyprus’ “own version of the Great Depression” and argues 
that the standard of living declined drastically.
^°Crawshaw(1978)p. 27
the Axis powers did not endorse the enosis movement. Greece also had to act in a 
reserved manner as it depended heavily on economic and military aid from London.
In 1948 Britain offered the Winster Constitution which provided more autonomy but 
was rejected by the Greek Cypriot leadership'as the plan might have barred the road to 
enosis. Reddaway (1986) argues that “at this distance of time the main significance 
of the various constitutional offers that were made by Britam in the post-war years is 
the simple fact that they were made from the British and rejected by the Greek Cypriot 
side”. However, the “acceptance or rejection by the two Cypriot communities 
depended not on the constitutional merits of the proposals, but on a political judgment 
as to whether they could be made to serve the cause of enosis’'P  In other words, the 
two communities were aheady fixed into the respective positions of driving toward 
enosis and only enosis, while the other aimed at preventing this aim at all costs.
The 1940s also marked the emergence of an important personality in the history of 
Cyprus. Makarios III, at the age of thirty-five, was elected as bishop of Klition. He 
assumed an active political role and became the leading force behind.the enosist drive. 
Owing to his fervent nationalist efforts and the organization of a plebiscite for enosis 
in 1950, Makarios was elected Archbishop of Cyprus and Ethnarch of the Greek 
Cypriot community.^ '* This was a tradition dating back from the Byzantine period. 
Accordingly, “the emperor [Byzantine] conferred on the archbishop of Cyprus certain 
extraordinary privileges which he maintains to the present day. [...] These privileges 
made the archbishop of Cyprus ethnarch, giving him civil and religious jurisdiction
^  The Winster Constitution was named after the island’s Governor Lord Winster.
^  Reddaway (1986) p. 40
®Ibid
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over the island”?^ Makarios’ much-quoted oath on his election as the Archbishop of 
Cyprus on 20.10.1950 is indicative of his position on the enosis issue:
“I take the holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and 
shall never waiver from oxir policy of annexing Cypms to mother Greece”.^ ^
1.5. Enosis
Here, it is appropriate to elaborate on the notion of enosis, what it means and why it 
signifies such importance. Enosis literally means ‘union’. In the context of Cyprus it 
designates union with Greece. Enosis finds its inspiration from the Greek notion of the 
Megali Idea. As illustrated earlier, the Megali Idea was described as the “hope that 
some future day all the Hellenes will unite and the Greek Kingdom will extend from 
Ionia (Western Anatolia) to the Black Sea and include Thrace, the coastlands of Asia 
Minor and Constantinople”.^  ^ As a natural sequence and in relation to Cyprus, the 
island should unite with “mother Greece”.
“The earliest recorded move toward liberating Cyprus from the Ottoman 
administration was made on 5 October 1609, and was repeated on 6 April 1911, and in 
November of the same year. On these three occasions the Greek Cypriot archbishop 
and his three bishops sent letters to Charles Emmanuel, the Duke of Savoy, appealing 
for help to free their land from the “tyrannical” rule of the Turks’’.^ * Despite the many 
obstacles against them the Greek Cypriots repeated their efforts with perhaps greater
"'‘'Oberling(1982)p. 39 
Koumoulides (1974) p. 16 
“  Sonyel (1985) p. 70 
Description used in Sonyel (1985) p. 2 
^  Koumoulides (1974) p. 77
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determination and hope during the period of the Greek War of Independence. In the 
year 1821 to 1829 there were several unsuccessful efforts aimed at liberating Cyprus 
from Turkish rule and toward enosis with Greece.^^ However, the enosis movement 
first found tangible expression in the 1931 riots and gained momentum with two 
simultaneous trends. First, the counter-reaction to strict British rule which followed the 
1931 riots. Second, the belief among Greek Cypriots that Britain might cede Cyprus to 
them in line with the general trend of de-colonisation in the world and the strength of 
nationalist fervor among Greek Cypriots. There is no doubt that the advent of 
Archbishop Makarios, a relentless activist and charismatic ethnarch provided the 
enosis movement with invaluable momentum. Hence, the movement intensified with 
his emergence on the Cyprus scene.
In 1951, the movement assumed a violent mode by employing the БОКА in its
struggle. The EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston), the National 
Organisation of Cypript Fighters, began its struggle to throw off British rule by means 
of political violence. “The liberation of Cypras from British rule was not the primary 
or ultimate objective; it was merely a necessary stage in achieving the true aim, which 
was enosis, not independence. EOKA’s resort to violence inevitably resulted in the 
killing of innocent non-combatants and introduced iuto the political life of Cypras a 
habit of violence which is still manifest thirty years later and which may by now have 
become ineradicable. That is the grim legacy that EOKA has left behind it in
Cypras”.31
Ibid, pp. 77-78 
^  Reddaway (1986) p. 77 
Ibid, pp. 57-58
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As Hans Kohn rightfully commented; “in reality, the champions of the Megali Idea 
and thus of enosis displayed a tendency to create “out of myths of the past and the 
dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any 
immediate connection with the present, and expected to become sometime a political 
reality”.^  ^However, the implications of the enosist drive in the longer-term politics of 
the eastern Mediterranean were rather different Perhaps, the real impact of the enosist 
drive in Cypriot politics was summarised by the former Governor of Cyprus, Sir 
Richmond Palmer in 1956. Palmer noted that;
“Enosis originally meant, and stiU. in its proper connotation means, the 
‘restoration of the Empire of Byzantium’, and a further dismantlement of what 
was once called the ‘Turkish Empire’ including the Hquidation of the Turkish 
conquests of both Constantinople and Cyprus...The Turks, who have so far 
behaved with great moderation, deeply resent this Enosis ideal of their own 
downfall - and justifiably - and it may well lead to war between Greece and 
Turkey if the agitation continues”
1.6. The Turkish Community
The Turkish community on the island, as indicated earlier, was made up of the 
descendants of the Ottoman administrators and those who were settled to Cyprus by 
the Ottoman government The Turkish community was subject to some limitations 
under Ottoman rule and these restrictions continued under British rule. Relatively, the 
position of the Turkish Cypriots worsened under British colonialism. They played no 
part in the 1931 riots but were equally subjected to the restrictions that followed. The 
Turkish Cypriots were alarmed by Greek Cypriot calls for enosis but were ill-
Hans Kohn quoted in Oberling (1982) p. 12
Sir Richmond Palmer, Governor of Cyprus 1933-1939 in the Sunday Times of March 25,1956 cited in Dr. Fazıl 
Küçük, The Cyprus Question - A Permanent Solution (Nicosia: Halkm Sesi Yayınlan, 1957) p. 7
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organized to face the rising demand for enosis?^ Stavrinides (1976) argues that the 
Turkish Cypriots were traditionally opposed to enosis and once they observed “the 
demonstrated capacity of the Greeks for violence, became iacreasingly horrified at the 
prospect of becoming a helpless minority within an unfriendly Greek state”?^
Inadequately organised among themselves, they aimed at drawing attention to their 
plight in Turkey. Until the early 1950s, the Turkish nationalist position was that, 
should Britain decide to leave Cyprus, the island should revert to Turkey. They 
passionately lobbied their cause with the help of Turkish Cypriots which were 
studying in Turkey. By 1948, the issue was taken up by the Turkish media and a 
Turkish Cypriot delegation visited Turkey.
“The Turkish Cypriots regarded the continued efforts of the Greek-Orthodox 
Church and the Greek Cypriots to turn Cypriots into a Greek island as 
provocative and detrimental to their legitimate rights because aU Turkish Cypriots 
believed what was ‘freedom’ for the Greek Cypriots was ‘enslavement’ for the 
Turkish Cypriots. ‘Freedom’ to the Greek Cypriots was synonymous with enosis, 
whereas, this to the Turkish Cypriots meant neo-colonization and forced exodus 
from Cyprus”.^ ’
It was this clash of divergent beliefs and opposing national aspirations and policies 
which was the root cause of the Cyprus problem and the intercommunal strife between 
the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.
^  Crawshaw (1978) pp. 43-44 
Stavrinides (1976) p. 33 
^Ubidp.24
Necati Münir Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute (Oxford UK; Rüstern & Brother, 1984) p. 2
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1.7. Political Violence: Prelude to Independence
The advent of Makarios provided enosis with new force and momentum. Also, in 1951 
Greece decided to take a more active role in the Greek Cypriot drive for enosis. Greece 
supported Makarios’ aim to internationalize the Cyprus issue. Greece raised the issue 
at the UN. The Greek Cypriots intended to rest their case on the notion of “self- 
determination”, a popular principle in the 1950s.^ * Athens officially asked Britain to 
cede Cyprus in 1953. Britain’s refusal diverted Athens’ attention to push for the 
internationalization of the matter. Hence, the Cyprus question was submitted to the UN 
General Assembly in 1954. Alarmed by the Greek/Greek Cypriot push for 
internationalization Turkey actively gathered opposition at the UN. Subsequently, the 
issue was shelved at the Assembly’s Political Committee with the active cooperation 
of Britain. Turkish opposition to the application of the principle of self-determination 
at that time derived from Ankara’s understanding that the acceptance of this principle 
would have opened the path to enosis. On 14 December 1954 Ankara clarified its 
position on Cyprus:
“Turkey is primarily concerned with the status of this island because of racial, 
historical, and contractual reasons...such course of action...could lead to 
serioxis consequences...[In the] “Question of Cypms,” nothing can be deemed 
to be based on justice and equity unless the cooperation and consent of Turkey 
is unequivocally obtained; for, otherwise, no decision can be lasting...Cyprus 
is important for the defense of Southern Turkey and of the Northern
Mediterranean in general”;39
Makarios wrote to the Secretary - General of the UN in 1953 that “an open unimpeachable plebiscite was held on 
January 15, 1950, the result of which was that 95.7 per cent of the Greek inhabitants or 80 per cent of the whole 
population of Cyprus by their vote expressed their determination to be incorporated into the Greek state by the 
organic union of this island with its Mother-country Greece”. Salih (1978) p, 8 
Salih (1978) p. 9. Also quoted in Stavrinides (1976) p. 31
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When international pressure did not suffice to make Britain respond Makarios became 
convinced that terrorism had to he employed as a political medium. Violence escalated 
with a tOTorist campaign against the colonial power by the EOKIA. The leader of this 
organisation, Colonel George Grivas, displaying an unusual talent for ruthless violence 
and effective revolutionary activity soon became a major nuisance for the British
colonial administration.40
From 1955 to 1959 the EOKA engaged in terrorism primarily aimed at the British 
colonial administration. As mentioned earlier, the Turkish Cypriots regarded the 
enosist movement detrimental to their interests and viewed it as a direct threat to their 
future existence in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots, which opposed EOKA operations joined 
forces with the colonial administration and thus became potential EOKA targets as 
well. Turkish Cypriots organised themselves under the Turkish Resistance 
Organisation (TMT) and aimed at resisting EOKA violence as much as they could. 
Both organizations received support from their ‘mother states’ but the TMT never 
became as organised and disciplined as tiie EOKA."^  ^While the EOKA was pro-active 
and anti-status quo, the TMT was defensive and aimed at maintaining the status quo on 
the island. In other words, by the late 1950s the two mother states, Turkey and Greece, 
were directly iavolved in the Cyprus issue. They both supported and aided their 
respective ethnic brethren materially and morally on the island.
The British were concerned about developments on the island. No British Government 
could concede enosis at the price of subjecting the Turkish Cypriots against their will
' Oberling (1982) p. 41. For a detailed account of EOKA activities during this era see Crawshaw (1986).
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to Greek rule and of thus alienating Turkey and precipitating a civil war in Cyprus and 
a conflict between Turkey and Greece. Eden, as Prime Minister, was convinced that;
“the Cyprus problem could never be settled imtil the importance of the Turkish 
position was understood and accepted. This means that enosis must be ruled
out as a solution”.'42
In 1955 Britain invited Turkey and Greece with a view to ease tensions on the island to 
a tripartite conference - the London Conference. By that time Britain had moved from 
the idea that Cyprus was a military base, and it calculated that securing basing rights 
would also serve British interests. During the conference the three participants offered 
Makarios self-government but Makarios rejected. That said, it must he underlined that 
the conference established an important fact. Despite claims to the contrary, it 
underlined that Turkey was a major actor in the solution and a vitally interested party 
in the dispute. Athens’ agreement to participate in the London Conference meant that 
Greece had accepted - however grudgingly it may have done so- that Turkey could not 
be excluded from any solution."^  ^As indicated earlier, Turkey argued that if  the status 
of Cyprus must he changed it should he returned to Turkey. The conference failed to 
produce any results and violence intensified on the island. When the British obtained 
concrete evidence in 1956 that Makarios was related to EOKA terrorism, he and his 
close aides were exiled to the Seychelles Islands. In the mean time Athens was busy
For an interesting analysis of the concept o f  mother states' and host states in the context of the Balkans see, Soner 
Qagaptay, Balkan Minorities and their Effect Upon Balkan Security (unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent 
University - Dept of International Relations, July 1995)
Reddaway (1986) p. 18
Greeks generally resent their participation to the London Conference and describe it as a strategic mistake to 
which they were lured in by the British.
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pressing for the application of the principle of self-deterrnination to Cyprus. 
However, such moves met with stiff opposition at the UN.
44
EOKA violence intensified, by leaps and bounds to which the colonial admimstration 
responded by moving to virtual military rule. In 1956 developments in. the Suez Canal 
caused a diirurdshing of British interests in the region. As a result, in 1957, with the 
hope of easing tensions, Makarios was released from his exile. The Turkish Cypriots, 
increasingly wary about British motives and severely demoralised under EOKA 
terrorism, began to push for taksim (partition). They were frilly backed by Ankara, 
which by now became aware of the possible consequences of enosis and pursued a 
more active role in the conflict.
During the 1950s the Turkish Cypriots began to move from mixed villages toward 
Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Turkish Cypriots were squeezed out of all bi-communal 
administrative organizations and were forced to establish their own municipalities.'^ ^ 
The exodus of mixed and isolated villages which began at that time ultimately led to 
the physical separation of the two communities. The establishment of separate 
municipalities was the first step in the creation of two distinct administrations.'^ ^
Relations between Turkey and Greece also deteriorated to the extent of becoming an 
urgent issue among NATO members. In 1958 Britain declared its readiness to give up 
sovereignty over Cyprus and encouraged Turkey and Greece to engage in direct talks. 
Both Turkey and Greece decided that going to war over Cyprus was not more
^  For a detailed account of the Greek view during this era see Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Lost Opportunities: 
The Cyprus Question 1950-1963 (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide Caratzas, 1986)
Oberling (1982) p. 61
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important than their future within NATO. Hence, under a rare climate of compromise 
the two sides agreed in Zurich in 1959 and in London in 1960 for the establishment of 
an indq)endent Cyprus.
The Zurich Agreement between Turkey and Greece produced a bi-communal 
constitutional framework for Cyprus which recognized the equality of the ‘two 
communities’ in many important matters and a large degree of political and cultural 
separateness."^  ^Makarios was reluctant to sign the London Agreement but was advised 
and pressured by Greece to do so. On August 16, 1960 the constitution was signed by 
Turkey, Greece, Great Britain, the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, and Cyprus
became an independent country.'^ * This arrangement constituted a victory for the Turks
/
and the Turkish Cypriots: with the Zurich-London Accords Makarios officially 
abandoned enosis and, the Turkish Cypriots were supplied with the legal protection 
they needed to survive in a highly ethnocentric societyN evertheless, the Greek 
Cypriot leadership viewed independence as a mere milestone rather than an end in 
itself.^ ®. On the day the Republic was inaugurated, Makarios delivered his widely 
quoted speech. He said:
Ibid
G.H. Dodd (ed.) The Political and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus (Huntingdon, UK; Eothen 
Press, 1986) p. 5
Mayes (1981) describes August 16, 1960 with the following remarks: “After 82 years of British rule the Union 
Jack at Government House was hauled down for the last time and in its place fluttered the defiant blue-and-white of 
Greece, the Turkish crescent and star on a menacing red, and between them the pale sun and laurel wreath of the 
Republic of Cyprus - an emblem irreverently described by one foreign journalist as ‘a fried egg surrounded by 
parsley’. Stanley Mayes, Makarios: A Biography (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1981) p. 147 
‘*^Oberling(1982)p.63
Şükrü Gürel argues in his Kibns Tarihi 1878-1960 (History of Cyprus 1878-1960) (1985) that the Greek Cypriot 
leadership agreed to the Zürich-London Accords because:
1. By the end of 1959, the Greek Cypriot leadership understood that the realization of enosis was at that stage 
impossible.
2. While some elements did not give up enosis, at this stage, the Greek Cypriot leadership viewed independence as 
a mandatory step.
3. Despite the above factors, the Greek Cypriot leadership did not want to sign the agreements which gave the 
Turkish Cypriots the status of co-partners, denied the Greek Cypriots ultimate domination and gave the Turkish 
Cypriots rights that exceeded those of minority rights.
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“Independence was not the aim and purpose of the EOKA straggle...Foreign 
factors have prevented the achievement of the national goal, but this should 
not be a cause for national sorrow...New bastions have been conquered and 
from these bastions the Greek Cypriots wül march on to complete the final 
victoiy’.^ ^
1.8. The Republic: An Artificial Creation
Following the establishment of the RepuhHc arguments developed between the Greek 
and Turkish leaderships on a number of constitutional issues. The Turkish side insisted 
on the speedy implementation of constitutional provisions which called for a 70:30 
ratio in the pubhc service and the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish 
municipalities and town councils. Initially, the Greek Cypriot public could not 
comprehend the comphcated constitution save understanding its full significance and 
consequences. However, as opponents of the agreements began to voice their 
opposition to the Constitution the new status quo became clearer. The Greek Cypriots 
widely believed that the Constitution favoured the Turkish Cypriots - which they 
viewed as a minority and not co-partners of the Republic - at their expense. On the 
other hand, the Greek Cypriot leadership viewed independence as a milestone and a 
compulsory step that international conditions imposed. They believed that although 
enosis was not achieved, taksim was not either. The British were out and despite some 
of the ‘unfair’ provisions in the Constitution the “Turks could be made, by persuasion, 
bribery or the application of economic pressures, to relinquish their more offensive 
privileges’’.^ ^
The Friends of the North Cyprus Parliamentary Group, (ed.) by Andrew Faulds, Excerpta Cypria for Today
(London: K. Rüstern & Brother, 1988) p. 27. Also, for more public statements by Makarios see Sonyel (1985) p. 69 
Stavrinides (1976) p. 45
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The most important outcome of the transition to an independent republic was the 
temporary end of political violence. An atmosphere of optimism prevailed in the 
international community and on the island. However, due to the mutually contradicting 
perceptions about the Republic matters soon came to a confrontation.^^ Frustrated by 
the Greek Cypriots’ refusal to implement the 70:30 quota in the civil service the 
Turkish Vice-President Küçük retaliated by vetoing legislation on the collection of 
taxes proposed in the House of Parliament. This state of affairs brought to the fore the 
whole question of separate municipalities and the veto powers of the Vice-President. 
The Greek Cypriots argued that the Constitution was too complicated and rendered 
majority rule im possible.A n increasingly tense and agitated atmosphere developed 
on the island. The Turkish Cypriots went to the Supreme Constitutional Court which 
decided that the Turkish demand for implementation of the separate municipalities 
clause and the Vice-President’s use of veto power were legal and constitutional. 
Makarios refused to comply with the Court’s ruling.
In the mean time, on the communal level there were also noteworthy developments. 
The Turkish sectors of the main cities developed rather independent features such as 
the provision of municipal services, As Stavrinides (1976) eloquently summarised it:
"The Greeks still wanted enosis, but were stuck with a Constitution which (a) 
expressly ruled enosis out; (b) gave the Turkish minority rights and privileges far 
in excess of those recognized by the UN Charter an over - generous share of the 
State structure, plus powers to resist the wishes of the Greek majority; and (c) gave
On the nature of Greek Cypriot intentions and conditions surrounding their acceptance to sign the Zürich-London 
Agreements see Nazim Güvenç, Kıbrıs Sorunu, Yunanistan ve Türkiye (The Cyprus Conflict, Greece and 
Turkey) (Istanbul: Çağdaş Politika Yayınlan, 1983) pp. 82-83 where he argues that Makarios agreed to sign the 
agreements only after Karamanlis’ threats and that he was clearly ill-intentioned about the working of the 
constitution. Also, for ample evidence about the premeditated nature of the Greek Cypriot attack see Chapter VI in 
Oberling (1982).
Greek Cypriots liken the term "unworkable constitution" imposed by outside powers.
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Turkey, as one of the Guarantor Powers, the right to intervene, should the 
constitutional order be destroyed"
Cyprus in 1960 had two separate nationalities, and two opposing nationalisms. She had 
a Constitution which supposedly provided for a unitary, integrated State to be operated 
by Greeks and Turks. In fact the Constitution, or some of its provisions at any rate, 
gave the appearance of a system of bilateral agreements regulating the relations 
between the two communities, each with a different conception of its own identity and
interests.56
What should have normally happened in 1963 was that the guarantor powers should 
have stepped in, in order to solve the crisis. Instead, Makarios proposed thirteen 
amendments, the first part in the famed Akritas Plan, primarily aimed at curbing 
critical rights given to the Turks. The amendments included (1) the end of veto 
powers, (2) the removal of the separate Turkish municipalities, (3) the reduction of the 
proportions of Turkish Cypriots in the bureaucracy and military, (4) the abolition of 
separate community voting on fiscal and other matters and (5) the election of the 
President and Vice-President by the House of Representatives (which had a Greek 
majority) acting together. These proposals were rejected by the Turkish Government 
and the Turkish Cypriots.^ ^
Following the Turkish refusal to agree to the amendments the Greek Cypriot 
leadership decided to 'solve the problem’ by violent means. Makarios agreed to the
Stavrinides (1976) p. 52 
Ibid, p. 43
Oberling (1982) argues that according to iht Akritas Plan the constitutional amendments would be formulated in 
such a way that they would seem “reasonable and jusf ’ but would actually deprive the Turkish community in 
Cyprus of its most cherished prerogatives.
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implementation of the second phase of the Akritas Plan, which was “a blueprint for a 
coup within the government to achieve enosis and to wipe out all opposition before it 
had any chance to solidify.^* By December 1963 tensions steadily rose and on 
December 21, 1963 the Greek Cypriots started a decisive attack on the Turkish 
Cypriots. The events of December 1963 would become the Turkish Cypriots’ 
Kristallnacht or Bloody Christmas as there were hundreds of Turkish casualties.^^ 
Ethnic violence spread throughout the island and a civil war was under way. On 
December 27 a permanent cease-fire line (the Green Line) was established in Nicosia 
and Lamaca. An estimated 25,000 Turkish Cypriots began a flight to large enclaves 
where they could be protected better.®  ^Turkish C5priots became subject to blockades, 
harassment, and fi’om time to time to severe military attacks purported by a revived
EOKA, named EOKA-B.61
Apart from the immense human suffering and loss of life the Bloody Christmas of 
1963 also signified the de facto end of the Republic. The crisis which was bom out of 
Makarios’ amendment proposals and the subsequent refusal developed with the sudden 
Greek Cypriot attack and spread over the island transforming into a civil war. 
Ironically, it produced the exact opposite aim of what the Akritas Plan had envisaged. 
It consolidated the physical separation of the two communities, the Greek Cypriots 
were unable to overrun the Turkish enclaves and almost precipitated a Turkish 
intervention.
The Akritas Plan was drafted by the then-interior Minister Polykarpos Yorgandjis, Tassos Papadopoulos 
(Minister of Labour) and Glafkos Klerides (Chairman of the House of Representatives) on the order of Makarios. 
The plan was first published in the Greek Cypriot daily Patris, on April 21,1966. For a full text of the Akritas Plan 
see Stavrinides (1976).
For a detailed Turkish perspective on the December 1963 violence see Abdûlhaluk Çay, K ibns’ta Kanlı Noel- 
1963 (Bloody Christmas in Cyprus-1963) (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınlan, 1989)
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1.9. Civil War (1964-1974)
In January 1964 Makarios said that he wished to terminate the Cyprus agreements. 
Two weeks later the London Conference convened where the Greek Cypriots, backed 
by Greece, demanded ‘unfettered independence’ on the ground that the Zurich 
settlement was unworkable. The Turkish Cypriots wanted a separatist solution while 
Ankara called for a federal state without the geographical separation usually associated 
with this form of governm ent.B y January 1964 almost all Turkish officials withdrew 
firom their positions on the basis that the government was no longer legitimate. In 
March 1964, British troops were called in to restore order, to be followed by a UN 
contingent, UNFICYP.^^ Despite Turkish objections, in February 1964, the Security 
Council in setting up UNFICYP referred to the Greek Cypriot government in a way to 
imply that it was the legitimate government of Cyprus. All UN states - except Turkey - 
accepted the Greek Cypriot government as the government of both communities. The 
same resolution also recognized the important role of the guarantor powers - a 
development which was a mixed blessing for the Greek Cypriots.
The Turkish Cypriots, living under deplorable conditions, relied heavily on food and 
medicine from Turkey. In June 1964 Turkey warned it would intervene directly but 
could only be stopped by a blunt US threat delivered in the form of a letter by 
President Johnson.^ Disturbed by Makarios’ overtures to the Soviets, Washington
According to official records cited in Oberling (1982), 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots were killed 
during the 1963-1964 crisis. In a vast exodus, upwards to 25,000 Turkish Cypriots fled their homes, often leaving 
their belongings behind.
Clement H. Dodd, The Cyprus Issue (Huntingdon, UK: Eothen Press, 1995) p. 4.
Crawshaw (1978) p. 367
UNFICYP stands for “United Nations Force in Cyprus”. Dodd (1995) p. 4 
^  The so-called Johnson letter, not only proved effective in discouraging Ankara from mounting a military 
intervention but also marked an unfortunate milestone in the history of Turco-American relations. Johnson’s letter 
implied that NATO could not come to Turkey’s aid should Turkey’s military intervention precipitate a Soviet 
invasion. The Johnson letter has assumed a notable focus of negativity which implies severe warning and 
admonition in Turkish political jargon.
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forwarded a proposal, later to be labelled die Acheson Plan. The plan provided for 
Cyprus’ union with Greece, a military base for Turkey and two autonomous Turkish 
cantons.^^ The Greeks rejected the plan while the Turks wanted a canton large enough 
to contain the great majority of the Turkish Cypriots.^ ® The following years were 
marked by an intense arms build-up on both sides. Greek officers secretly landed on 
the island and eventually reached up to 10,000. Turkish army officers organized and 
trained the TMT irregulars. The Greeks were determined to create a unitary state in 
which the Turks had nothing more than minority rights and returned to their own 
villages. The Turks were convinced that short of partition only federal government
could give them adequate security. 67
Fighting continued on all fronts with each side striking at the first opportune time and/
whenever they felt they had the upper hand. In 1967 fighting again intensified with 
Grivas initiating major operations against the Turks. In November of the same year 
Turkey notified the international community that it was “determined to settle the 
problem once and for all”. Due to rmfavourable weather conditions the Turkish 
intervention had to be delayed and international mediators launched an intense peace 
initiative. As a result, Greece agreed to withdraw 12,000 troops and Grivas from 
Cyprus. Makarios was not totally opposed to these measures as it weakened opposition 
to him but also made Cyprus more vulnerable to a Turkish military intervention. 
Makarios commented at the end of 1967 that a solution to the Cyprus problem must be 
sought “within the limits of what is feasible which does not always coincide with what
The Acheson Plan, named after former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, also called for the cession of the small 
Greek island of Meis (Kastellorizon) to Turkey. This was a compensatory provision of the plan,
Crawshaw (1978) p. 371 
Ibid, p. 372 
 ^Ibid, p. 377
67
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is desirable”.*^  ^ Most importantly, the developments of 1967 revealed that “at the
crunch Greece could not defend Cyprus against Turkey”.70
Between 1967 and 1970 the island experienced some peace as restrictions against the 
Turks were lifted hut intercommunal talks, which began in 1969, made no progress - 
largely due to Makarios’ refusal to grant complete authority to the Turkish areas. 
Differences between Makarios, Grivas and Athens became more pronoimced and by 
1973 the situation increasin^y got out of hand. In November 1973 the junta in Greece 
was replaced by a military regime. Grivas died in early 1974 but the influence of 
Greek officers grew bigger among the Greek Cypriot armed forces.
1.10.1974: Turkish Intervention
On 15 July 1974, led by Greek officers, the National Guard overthrew the Cyprus 
Government. Makarios fled from Cyprus. The leader of the coup, Nicos Sampson, 
replaced Makarios. Turkish Cypriots instantly withdrew to their enclaves. Prime 
Minister Ecevit flew to London and sought the support of the British Government 
under the Treaty of Guarantee. The British were not prepared to send troops into 
Cyprus. Turkey alarmed by the sei2ure of power in Cyprus backed by the Greek junta 
launched a military intervention on July 20, 1974.^  ^ The Turkish aim was to stop 
Cyprus from becoming Greek and to protect the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Peace 
Operation, as it is called in Turkish political jargon, initially secured an important area 
between Gime and Lefko§a, notwithstanding the fact that they faced more Greek 
resistance than was expected. The Sampson government fell, as did the military regime
69 Ibid,p. 379 
’ Dodd (1995) p. 6
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in Athens. A cease-fire was arranged and the Turkish government demanded that the 
Ghreek Cypriots accept immediately a plan for six Turkish cantons. In reality, the 
Turkish intervention effectively partitioned the island (See Map Till). Approximately 
160,000-180,000 Greek Cypriots fled to the South while a total of 60,000 Turkish 
Cypriots moved to the North (some of them did so in the following year).^^ In August 
a conference was called in Geneva. The conference ended in failure. Prime Minister 
Ecevit ordered a second military offensive. Greece declared that it was unable to 
declare war on Turkey in Cyprus and on 16 August Turkish forces stopped their 
advances. The greater part of northern Cyprus - 37 per cent of the island - was under 
Turkish control. The foundations for a federal state, with two autonomous 
administrations, had been laid, Ecevit stated.
1.11. Post-Intervention Developments and Negotiations
The next historical milestone was the decision of the Turkish Cypriots - now safe in 
the North from molestation - to declare in 1975 that they constituted the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC).^ "^  The TFSC was an indication of what sort of 
future Turkish Cypriots had in mind for Cyprus. It was to be a federated, bi-zonal and 
bi-communal state in which one part of the federation was formed with the expectation 
that the other side would follow suit. A constitution was presented to the Turkish 
Cypriots which was approved by popular referendum in 1975.
For a detailed account of the Turkish Peace Operation see Mehmet Ali Birand, Otuz Sıcak Gün (Thirty Hot 
Days) (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınlan, 1985) which is also available in English.
^  These figures are based upon Behroz Morvaridi “Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use’" in 
Clement. H. Dodd (ed.) The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus (Huntingdon, UK: 
Eothen Press, 1993) pp. 219-234. Greek Cypriot sources identify the number of displaced Greek Cypriot as 
200,000-220,000. Oberling (1982) points to Greek Cypriot statistics (as of June 9, 1975) that 182,000 people 
crossed the ‘Atilla Line’ to the South. According to the 1960 census 138,823 people were living in the area of 
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.
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In August 1975 the two sides agreed to a population exchange which facilitated the 
exchange of the remaining refugees on both sides. Also, much to the chagrin of the 
Greek Cypriots approximately 9,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees were allowed by the 
British to leave for Turkey from where they were sent to Northern Cyprus. Also, an 
uncertain number of Turks from mainland Turkey were settled into Northern Cyprus 
during the first years immediately following the Turkish intervention.^^
Map LIL Cyprus After the Turkish Intervention in 1974
Since 1974 numerous negotiation marathons were held between the two sides. Here 
are milestones and turning points in these negotiations:
Crawshaw (1978) p. 393 
■"* Dodd (1995) p. 7
There are no official figures about the exact number of mainland settlers in Northern Cyprus. According to 
Morvaridi (1993) by 1993, the number of mainland settlers reached 25,000 - 35,000 people. Greek Cypriot sources 
quote figures that well exceed Morvaridi. A Greek Cypriot information network called ekeka quoted 70,000 
(http://www.ekeka,com/pagell.html) while other Greek sources entertain figures such as “over 84,000”. For 
additional information see internet websites such as “http://www.glavx.org/cyprus/occoloni.htm”.
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The first milestone is the Set Of Principles of 1977, which was the result of lengthy 
intercommunal talks between Makarios and Dehkta§. Accordingly, the two sides 
agreed to the following:
1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal Republic;
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the 
light of economic viability or productivity and land-ownership;
3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right 
of property and other specific matters are open for discussion taking into consideration 
the fundamental basis of a bi-commrmal federal system and certain practical 
difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot commxxnity;
4. The powers and fionctions of the central federal government will be such as to 
safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-commimal character of the
State.76
These principles were reaffirmed in 1979 but negotiations faced difficulties. Makarios 
died in 1977 and was replaced by Spyros Kyprianou who adopted a policy of “long 
struggle” which aimed at exerting pressure on Turkey to withdraw its forces from 
Northern Cyprus; to isolate the TFSC and strangulate the Turkish Cypriot economy. 
Kyprianou had little interest in inter-communal talks and thus a paiod of stalemate 
began. Kyprianou’s intransigence was consolidated by the rise of socialist leader 
Andreas Papandreou in Greece who was against any compromise in the negotiations.
Text borrowed from Dodd (1993) p. 18
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Frustrated by the lack of progress in the interconununal talks, the Turkish Cypriots 
declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC hereafter), an independent 
state, albeit one only recognized by Turkey in 1983. This move was immediately 
condemned by the UN Security Council which declared that the “purported secession 
of part of the Republic of Cyprus...was [legally] invalid”.^  ^ Nevertheless, the 
declaration of the TRNC did not mean an end to the notion of a bi-communal, bi-zonal 
federal solution.
By 1984, however, with the help of the UN, proposals were produced which; 
embraced (1) a reduction of Turkish Cypriot territory to some 29 per cent of the 
whole-which meant giving up Mara§A''arosha (see Map I.III), and the transfer of other 
land to Greek Cypriot control for settlement by refugees, (2) agreement on federation- 
with residual rights falling not to the center, but to each community (always an 
important point for the Turkish Cypriots), (3) acceptance in principle of the withdrawal 
of foreign forces, (4) the re-opening of Nicosia Intemational Airport, (5) the 
establishment of working groups to discuss the exercise of the freedom of movanent, 
settlement and the ownership of property.’* These proposals were turned down by the 
Greek Cypriot side.
In 1990 the Greek Cypriot Administration applied for membership to the EU. Talks 
broke down again during the same year when President Denkta§ advanced the TRNC's
”  Ibid, pp. 24-25
The Mara§A^arosha area is a fenced unoccupied area of some 4 km by 1.5 km south of Magosa/Famagusta 
though under the control of the TRNC government Dodd (1995) p. 9
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priorities by talking in terms of ‘self-determination’ and ‘peoples’ instead of 
‘ communities
In 1992 the Set of Ideas, which included a map showing proposed reductions of 
Turkish Cypriot territory was presented by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros 
Gali to the two sides. The Set o f Ideas proposed inter alia as follows:
(1) Politically equal communities in a federal repubhc, but political equality was not 
to mean numerical equality in all institutions of government;
(2) A Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot President Vice-President both 
elected universally,
(3) Reductions of Turkish Cypriot territory as in the map to include Mara§A^arosha 
and part of the Guzelyurt/Morphou area;
79 Dodd (1995) p. 9
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(4) The right of refiigees to return to their homes;
(5) The three freedoms (movement, settlement, ownership of property).
The Turkish Cypriot side rejected the Set of Ideas, though not wholly and called for 
some amendments. The Greek Cypriot side did not accept these amendments but 
recognized the Set of Ideas as a basis for negotiation. However, with the election of 
Glafkos Klerides as President in 1993 the Greek Cypriot side declared that it objected 
to the Set of Ideas. This development spared President Denkta§ from further pressure.
Following the collapse of the Set of Ideas initiative in 1993, the UN promoted 
measures to build confidence between the two sides. The Confidence-Building 
Measmes (CBM) include cooperation on water problems, meetings of political party 
leaders, the development of joint commercial projects, and two that are vital-the 
settlement of the fenced area of Mara§A^arosha, and the re-opening of Nicosia 
International Airport (NIA). Negotiations focused on these two items. Disagreements 
arose over these two important issues primarily due to the Greek Cypriot side’s refusal 
to agree to any provision which might imply recognition of the TRNC.
In June 1994 major concessions were made by the Turkish side on the Mara§A^arosha 
issue in Vienna and the UN appeared to be ready to push for the implementation of the 
CBMs. However, the Greek Cypriot side, citing procedural matters, refused to approve 
the implementation of the Vienna Accords.
In 1994 the European Court of Justice ruled a ban on exports from tl^ e TRNC to EU 
countries. This development had an adverse effect on the negotiations process. The
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TRNC decided not to carry on with negotiations over the CBMs while the ban was in 
place and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) continued to pursue its drive for 
unilateral membership in the EU. The TRNC also decided that the “separate 
sovereignty of the TRNC was re-afSrmed” and any new negotiations would “have to
Q 1
take into account the political equality and sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots. 
Also, the TRNC assembly repealed previous resolutions which had envisaged 
“federation as the sole form of settlement in Cyprus”, whilst not excluding it 
altogether. The Greek Cypriot Administration responded by a statement which read “a 
Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and 
international personality and a single citizenship”. Moreover, the GCA argued that it 
was necessary for the Security Council “to be asked to consider coercive measures 
against the side which is flouting its resolutions, or adopt other and more coercive
R9procedures”.
Since 1994, the EU application of the GCA has come to dominate the agenda between 
the two side’s limited discourse and negotiation. The Greek Cypriot side has become 
more accommodating due to its desire to join the EU while the Turkish Cypriot side 
maintained its desire for the implementation of the CBMs. That said, Turkey signed a 
Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 which went into effect hi January
1996. In exchange of lifting the Greek veto to the Union’s Customs Union agreement 
with Turkey, the EU agreed to enter hito membership negotiations with the GCA in
1997. Despite stem warnings by Turkey and regret by the US, the beginning of official 
membership negotiations with the EU hijacked accumulating/momentum in favour of
Dodd (1995) p. 15
Ibid
Ibid
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an American initiative lead by Richard Holbrooke for a final settlement. Frustrated by 
Denkta§’ insistence on the recognition of the TRNC as a pre-condition for any 
negotiations, the Holbrooke initiative ended with failure. Further, the US expressed its 
dissatisfaction with Denkta§’ pre-condition and regret for the untimely start of 
membership negotiations between the GCA and EU. In retaliation to the EU-GCA 
negotiations Turkey declared that it would take action in kind and stressed that the 
acceptance of the GCA as full member to the EU would be illegal in light of the 1960 
Zürich-London Agreements and that such a move might lead to the eventual union of 
Turkey and the TRNC.
In need to counter the GCA-EU negotiations, Turkey in consultation with President 
Denkta§, jointly announced a “Confederation Proposal” in 1998. This proposal, while 
rigid on the equality of two political entities offered some new elements as it did 
acknowledge the possibility of the TRNC joining the EU membership negotiations.
34
U)
CHRONOLOGICAL CHART OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
.
Time Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriots state of Relations
9th C. B.C. - 5.th B.C. G reek  cd ontets  In Cyprus N /A N/A
Third Crusade -1489 Ruled by Luslgnlans and Latins N /A N /A
1489-1571 R ule By Venetians N/A N/A
1571-1821 O ttom an Rule  ^ Population Tran sfe r Cordial
1821 G reek W a r  of Independence Relatively secure - Muslim  Identity O ttom an administration suspicious
1821-1878 M egall Idea Is entertained C oncerns am ong the elite Gradually unpleasant
1878-1914 British R ule-O ttom an Sovereignty M uslim  Identity - Peaceful - suspicion present
1914-1923 British Annexation O ttom ans do not accept S l ^  deterioration
1923 M ainland shake-up/TurkIsh Republic Cordial
1931 First Enosis Riot Increasing concerns Inter-ethnic relations strained
1931-1950 Drive for enosis Formulation o f reaction Steady deterioratlon/susplclon
1950 T h e advent o f M akarlos Reflexive defense -  cooperation with the British Deterioration -  S tress
1950-1960 E O K A  violence -  agitation Opposition to enosis /  support the British Tension and political violence
1960 Settling for the C yprus R epublic Hope for a  N ow  Era In Cyprus O ptim ism  -  lull In violence
1960-1963 Attem pts to change the constitutional order Opposing moves to change constitution . Non-violent disagreem ent
1963-1974 Pursuit o f end by m eans o f violence Opposing organisation /  resistance Inter-ethnic violence
1974 Sam pson C oup - G reek  power struggle P ressure on m ainland Turkey to act Periodic violence
1974 Loss o f substantial territory-displacem ent Salvation -Turkish mainland Intervention W a r
1974-1983 UN  -  lead Negotiations U N  -  lead Negotiations /  Restructuring Divided Island
1983 Declaration of T R N C  shocks G reeks Moves toward separateness - T R N C Increasingly equal footing
1983-1993 Building the econom y Consolidation o f the T R N C Increasingly antagonistic
1990 Unilateral application to the E U Developing T R N C Limited dialogue
1993 G reek/G reek-C ypriot Joint D efense Doctrine Problem s In the econom y Limited dialogue
1996-Present Application for full m em bership to the E U Opposed to the South's EU  application Periodic crises -  border Incidents
Chart LI. Chronological Chart of Cyprus
CHAPTER II. MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS AND SELF-PERCEPTIONS
How nations perceive themselves and other nations influence their foreign policies. 
Perceptions play an important role in defining national interests, military doctrines and 
foreign policy behavior overall. History shapes these perceptions as nations mteract 
with one another. Turco-Greek relations both in Cyprus and outside Cyprus are no 
exception. Therefore, it is integral to understand how Turks see Greeks as well as 
themselves, and how Greeks perceive the Turks and what they see in themselves. The 
following section of this paper will analyze the most influential factors that shaped the 
respective natures of Turco-Greek perceptions.
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot perceptions should be dealt with at two different, 
albeit^inter-related levels. Firstly, at the macro-level, namely mainland Turkish and 
Greek self-perceptions as well as self-perceptions ought to be examined. Secondly, at 
the micro-level Turkish and Greek Cypriot self-perceptions and perceptions of the 
other side on the island should be explained.
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2.1. THE GREEKS
The Macro Picture
...the barbarians will arrive today; 
and they are bored by eloquence and public speaking.
(C.P. Cavafis)
2.1.1. Historical Linearity - Invaders From The East
The root of Greek perceptions of Turks can be traced back to the Selçuk Turkish 
victory against the Byzantine army at Malazgirt (Manzikert) in 1071.^  Following 
Malazgirt, the Turks flooded into Anatolia. Small Turkish groups established their own 
little states, or emirates throughout Anatolia. However, while the battle at Malazgirt 
was a turning point in history for Turks and Greeks alike what truly was a milestone in 
the formation of Greek perceptions about Turks was the Turkish conquest of 
Constantinople. Constantinople was the capital and crown city of the once glorious 
Byzantine Empire. Greek perceptions about this event reveal both boundless 
imagination but also a deep psychological trauma for the Greeks. The following 
passage is only a tiny fracture of the rich literature not only describing the event but 
also qualifying the perceived tragedy.^ The selective usage of natural signs is reflective 
of Byzantine modes of thought, which saw all human endeavor as constitutiug part of 
the divine dispensation.^ It also provides the contemporary reader with a sense of 
perceived magnitude the fall of Constantinople signified to the Greeks;
' For a western account of the Battle of Malazgirt see Alfred Friendly, The Dreadful Day (London: Hutchinson & 
Co. Publishers, 1981)
 ^For a theoretical analysis of the role of perceptions in International Relations see Robert Jervis, Perceptions and 
Misperceptions (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992) and Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International 
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
 ^Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 17
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“On the night of 24 May [1453] the dome of St Sophia appeared to be suffused 
with a red glow that crept slowly up and around from its base to the great gilt 
cross at the top. The light lingered there for a moment and then went out. The 
crowds who saw it were in no mind to explain it as a reflection from the 
flames of the Turkish bonfires beyond tiie walls. It must be an omen. Nicolo 
Barbaro says that it looked like an eclipse of the moon. Had not the prophets 
warned that the city would fall in the days when the moon was waning? Others 
interpreted it as a sign that the holy light in the cathedral of the Holy Wisdom, 
and with it the guardian angel of the city, had gone forever. The Virgin too, 
who had always been its protectress, seemed to be wavering her affections. 
When the most hollowed of her icons was brou^t out to be paraded rormd the 
streets, it slipped off the framework on which it was being carried alofl;; and 
almost at once a thimderstorm broke out and the city was deluged with torrents 
of rain and hail. Such a coincidence would have made the Byzantines anxious 
at the best of times. In their present state of terror and creduHty it moved them 
to hysteria”.'*
The fall of Constantinople is usually depicted as one of the most central historical 
events for Greeks. Volkan & Itzlcowitz (1994) have engaged in a psychological study 
of Turks and Greeks as neighbors. They argue that the fall of Constantinople is a 
“chosen trauma” for the Greeks and it signifies an “intense feeling of having been 
humiliated and victimized” by the Turks.^  Accordingly, if the losses associated with 
the event cannot be mourned, and the shared narcissistic injury cannot be resolved “the 
mental representation of the event remains alive and the group draws it into its very 
identity”.^
Donald M. Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261-1453 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 
p. 385
 ^ Vamik D. Volkan & Norman It2kowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict (Huntingdon UK: The 
Eothen Press, 1994) p. 36. According to the authors, chosen trauma refers to the mental representation of a shared 
event that causes a large group (ie. ethnic groups) to feel helpless and victimized by another group and thus assume 
a shared humiliating injury. Such a mental representation includes the real and fantasized memories of the event 
along with associated shared feelings of hurt and shame and defenses against the perceived shared conflict they 
initiate.
 ^ Vamik D. Volkan, “Turks and Greeks of Cyprus”, ed. Vangelis Calotychos, Cyprus And Its People (Boulder 
CO: Westview Press, 1998) p. 281. “All of these traditions emanating from the capture of Constantinople, in
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"The fact was that the loss of Constantinople could not be mourned. After the 
initial shock, disbelief, and anger, the shared work of mourning could not take a 
‘normal’ course’, it was contaminated...Fuithermore, the loss of Constantinople 
reopened the wounds caused by the loss of Jerusalem. The two losses were 
condensed. While Jemsalem had been ‘regained’ and ‘relost, the reaction to the 
defeat at Constantinople was only helplessness. The fall of Constantinople to the 
Turks, which came four hundred years after Manzikert, became the major 
chosen trauma for the Christian world"
From the moment the Turkish armies appeared at the plains of Malazgirt to the Selçuk 
and Ottoman raids into Anatolia; from the fall of Constantinople to Turkokratia 
(Ottoman rule) over Greece; the Greeks have from the very beginning viewed the 
Turks as invading barbarians not only heathen and unwanted in religious dimensions,
n
but also devoid of any civilizational quality whatsoever. In antiquity their oracle at 
Delphi was literally, to them, ‘the navel of the world’, and they called all other peoples 
barbarians.^ This indeed is a true depiction of the Turks in Greek minds. For them, the 
fall of Constantinople not only signified the death-knell of their sacred Byzantine 
Empire but also meant that the barbarians from the East were at the doors of the capital 
of a historic, albeit crumbling, civilization.
particular those nebulous oracles predicting the downfall of the Turks and the recapture of the city*..generally had 
wide currency. Many extant manuscripts attest their circulation throughout Russia and Western Europe. This 
oracular literature conveys a sense of the profound disquiet which afflicted Christian consciences everywhere after 
the fall, while at the same time marking the persistence of Greek faith in the ultimate restoration of their nation.” 
Apostólos E. Vacapoulos, The Origins of the Greek Nation (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970) p. 205 
 ^Vamik D. Volkan & Norman Itzkowitz (1994) p. 37
 ^ Greek legends are full with prophecies about Greeks driving the Turks back to where they came from. One 
interesting example, which reflects the Greek mindset is worth noting. “The angel would then say to him, ‘take this 
sword and avenge God’s people’, whereupon the ‘Romans’ would turn upon the Turks, put them to flight and cast 
them out of Constantinople; nor would pursuit end until the very boundaries of Persia had been reached - at Kokkini 
Melia [Red Apple Tree] in the place called Monodendrion [Only one tree]. Apostólos E. Vacapoulos, The Origins 
of the Greek Nation (1970) pp. 203-204
 ^David Holden, Greece Without Columns (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1972) p. 37
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2.1.2. Byzantíum - Oriental Traits of National Identity
The Byzantine heritage of the Greeks is ironically not much part of the mental image 
that the West is willing to consider in relation to Greece. Contrary to the West and its 
fixed image toward the Greeks, the Turks encountered the Greeks as Byzantines and 
firequently refer to them by their Byzantine credentials. Byzantium achieved its 
classical form in which two elements predominated. These were the Greek language 
and the Orthodox church. Byzantine self-identification did not stretch as far back as 
ancient Greece but rather embraced Romaio, or Romans who spoke Greek. More 
importantly, was their belief that ‘Christ was complete in hmnanity as well as 
divinity’, which made them irreconcilably at odds with the Latins who made up the 
western Roman Em pire.H ence, the Byzantine Empire represented not only political 
difïjerentiation but also a religious alternative to the West. Ironically, Byzantium 
suppressed everything that was associated with pagan Hellenism and caused the 
provincial stagnation of peninsular Greece, something that was to be remedied when 
19th century Greek nation-building set in.
The Byzantine heritage meant the adoption of a particular sense of destiny, which 
among other things stipulated the myth of being the “Heirs of the Promise, the people 
with a unique future”.^  ^ Toynbee (1962) describes the notion of being ‘Heirs of the 
Promise’ as an “extravagantly improbable belief which implies being the chosen heirs 
of Israel, Greece and Rome, with whom, in consequence the fiiture lies”.^ ^
This summarised reasoning has been borrowed by Vamik D. Volkan & Norman Itzkowitz (1994) p. 24 
"  Arnold J. Toynbee, “Russia’s Byzantine Heritage” Readings in Russian History Vol. I (New York: Thomas Y. 
Cromwell Company, 1962) p. 85 
'^Ibid
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Apart from the religious-romantic ramifications of the conquest of Constantinople, it 
also signified a change in the power relation between Turks and Greeks. The 
growing power of the Ottoman state b rou^ t about the downfall of the Eastern Roman 
Empire - Byzantium. From now on, the Greeks would become subject to the 
domination of the Turks. In fact, “the astonishingly rapid advance of the Turks in 
eastern Europe in the fourteenth century demonstrates the pitiful weakness of 
Byzantium when confronted with the vitality of a vigorous new people. It was the 
Slavs and not the Greeks who at the end found the means and the will to put up some 
real, if  ineffective, resistance to the Turks”.
Since the Turkish conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the key dimension between the 
grcjwmg Ottoman Empire and thus the Turks and the crumbling Byzantine Empire and 
thus the Greeks, became the power dimension. Mutual perceptions were reinforced by 
power considerations.
2.1.3. The Role of the Orthodox Church - Depository of History
Another important element of Greek self-perception is rooted in the special 
relationship between the Greek state and its Orthodox tradition.
The Byzantine Empire came to be identified with the Orthodox Church. “As an 
iastitutionalized bond for a heterogeneous collection of peoples, the Church had a 
value that, in the begiiming at any rate, far surpassed its theological message”. The 
Orthodox Church, while described by Holden (1972) as an oriental cult that is other-
Suat Kmiklioglu, Turco-Russian Relations After the Disintegration of the Soviet Union (unpublished 
Honours Thesis: Carleton University, 1994) p. 30
Donald M. Nicol, The End of the Byzantine Empire (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1979) p. 95 
Holden (1972) p. 72
41
worldly and mystical, fulfilled an important role during the Greeks’ subjection to 
Turkish rule.^  ^It served as a sanctuary, a depository of a glorious past. For the Greeks;
“all that survived to remind them of their imperial past was their rehgion. It was 
their Orthodox faith and not their Hellenic philosophy that fortified them ia 
hours of need. A Greek under Turkish rule would enter his local church and 
monastery as one entering into a forgotten world of glory, where the paintings 
and icons woidd recall the peculiar yet famiHar Byzantiue blend of imperial and
celestial mystery...”.17
Notwithstanding the dramatic descriptions about the “fall of Constantinople” in 
contemporary terms it meant a new sort of administration which was by far favored to 
the Latins. The Greeks had to “choose between two odious alien yokes. Faced with 
this grievous choice, the medieval Greek Orthodox Christians passionately rejected the 
yoke of their schismatic Western fellow Christians, and with open eyes elected, as the 
lesser evil, the yoke of the Muslim Turks.^^ They would rather behold in 
Constantinople the turban of Muhammad rather the Pope’s tiara or a cardinal’s haf’.^ ^
Orthodox Greeks interpreted the fall of the city to tbe heathen Turks as “God’s 
judgement brought down upon those Christians because of the sins of Christians 
everywhere”. Byzantium had fallen to the Turks - a just punishment for tampering 
with the purity of the Orthodox faith and signing with the Latins the detestable Union 
of Florence.^ ®
Ibid, p. 73
Nicol (1979) pp. 95-96
Also see Montgomeiy W. Watt, Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions (London: 
Routledge Press, 1991) or Volker R. Berghahn & Hanna Schissler, Perceptions of history: international textbook 
research on Britain, Germany and the US (Leamington Spa NY: St Martin's Press, 1987).
Proof to relative Ottoman tolerance is Arnold J. Toynbee’s “Russia’s Byzantine Heritage: I in Sidney Harcave, 
Readings in Russian History VoI.I (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1962) p. 88
Greek anger at the Latins’ reluctance to come to the aid of Constantinople survived the five centuries which 
follow^ the actual event (see below). “If the fall of Constantinople severed the last tenuous link between 
Byzantium and the West, if thereafter the Christians in thb Ottoman Empire clung more jealously than ever to their 
Orthodoxy and their suspicion of the Latins, who can say that the western world was not to blame for having willed
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The impact of the “fall of the city” resonated extensively in the Greek psyche, and not 
always in quite rational ways. For instance, “Constantinople was captured by the Turks 
on a Tuesday, and every Tuesday thereafter has been treated by the Greeks and some 
other Christians as an unpropitious day of the week. George Papandreou returned to 
liberated Athens on 18 October 1944, having delayed his arrival by twenty-four hours 
to avoid landing on a Tuesday, always of ill omen in the Greek world as the day on 
which Constantinople had fallen to the Turks”.^ ^
2.1.4. Turkokratia - The Source of All Sins
The period described by Greeks as Turkokratia, approximately 400 years of Ottoman 
Turkish rule, had a profound impact on Greek society. Clogg (1992) summarised the 
^amework of this era with an emphasis of the detachment on Greek society from 
Europe:
"Ottoman rule had the effect of isolating the Greek world from the greatest 
historical movements such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the 
seventeenth-century scientific revolution, the Enlightenment and the French and 
Industrial Revolutions that so influenced the historical evolution of western
Europe" 22
These 400 years of Turkish rule determined the relations between Turks and Greeks 
and close on 100 years of Independence strug^e - often conducted with great brutality 
on both sides - have created in the Greek mind the picture of an ancestral enemy 
against whom one must be on one’s guard. In addition, “this fear has been 
strengthened by the collective perception of time wholly different from that of Western
them into a spiritual alienation as the price of material help which never came? Donald M. Nicol (1979) 95-96. Also 
see Dimitri Obolensky, “Russia’s Byzantine Heritage” in Sidney Harcave Readings in Russian History VoL I 
(New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1962) p. 85 
Richard Clogg (1992) p. 136 
“  Ibid, p. 3
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Europe or Turkey. For Greeks the fall of Constantinople is recent history, the Ottoman 
Occupation was the day before yesterday, the War of Independence yesterday whilst 
the Greek expansionist initiative of 1921-3 which ended in the Asia Minor Catastrophe 
and the expulsion of the Greeks of Asia Minor is stiU living present”.^ ^
bi line with this vein of thinking, Greeks perceive sacrifices made dining the era of 
Turlcokratia as constituting part of the darkest period in Greek history. Hence, Greeks 
believe that they are legitimately entitled to avenge themselves for the perceived 
injuries they suffered 500 years ago....^ '^
2.1.5. Megali Idea - A Not So Great Idea
One of the tenets of official Greek ideology, subscribed by the intellectual 
establishment since the founding of the Greek state in 1821, is the unbroken continuity 
of Greek culture since Classical times. Greek intellectuals have usually been tom 
between pride in their descent from the ancients, and regret that they have been bom 
too late to participate in the matchless civilization that their forefathers created.^ ^ 
However, in a world of extreme territorial consciousness and strong links between 
defined territory and national identity, the Greek notion of “unbroken continuity” 
creates significant problems. “First of all, during the ancient period, namely “the 
Hellenistic world of Alexander and the Greek diaspora we are scarcely dealing with a 
territorial concept at all, but rather with a string of cultural and commercial· 
communities stretching from the mouth of the Mediterranean plains to northern
^  Heinz Richter, “The Greek-Turkish Conflict” in (eds) Marion Sagaris & Martin Eve Background To 
Contemporary Greece (Lx)ndon: Merlin Press, 1990) p. 317 
Şükrü Elekdag, "The cost of being late” Turkish Times April 1, 1999 Year 11 No. 226 
^  Peter Mackridge, “Katharevousa (c. 1800-1974) An Obituaiy For An Official Language” in Background To 
Contemporary Greece (London: Merlin Press, 1990) p. 26. Interestingly, the Bavarian who became king in 1832, 
and the Dane who replaced him in 1863, took the title of basileus (emperor) of the Greeks. For further detail see
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India”. Byzantium, particularly toward the end of it, also did not provide a 
territorially defined attachment apart firom the city of Constantinople as both its capital 
and psychological epi-center. Once independence was attained in 1830, the fact 
remained that the Greek kingdom embraced within its borders such a small proportion, 
less than a third, of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire. George Seferis 
eloquently noted the disparity “Greece...though a small country, is in reality many 
Greeces”.^  ^The prevalent contradiction between what was desired and was actual fact 
gave rise to the “Great Idea” or Megali Idea which aspired to unite within the bounds 
of a single state, whose capital would be Constantinople, all the Greek areas in the 
Near East.^ * Indeed, most Greeks lived outside the borders of the newly created 
Greece. loannis Kolettis, a most fervent proponent of the idea summarised the essence 
of the concept of the Megali Idea:
“The Greek kingdom is not the whole of Greece, but only a part, the smallest and 
poorest part. A native is not only someone who lives within this Kingdom, but 
also one who lives in loannina, in Thessaly, in Serres, hi Adrianople, hi 
Constantinople, in Trebizond, in Crete, in Samos and in any land associated with 
Greek history or the Greek race...”.^ ^
“The Megali Idea, reflecting and reinforcing as it did the messianic longings of 
prophecies that enjoyed such wide currency during the period of Ottoman rule and, 
indeed, into modem times, was to be the dominant ideology of the emergent state”.^ ° 
Crawshaw (1978) elaborated on the iimer workings of the concept of the Megali Idea:
♦ 26
Warren Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1997) 
p. 852
“  Holden (1972) p. 22
George Seferis as quoted in David Holden, Greece Without Columns p. 55 
Richard Clogg (1992) pp. 47-48
loannis Kolettis before the constituent assembly in 1844, Clogg (1992) p. 48 
^^ Ibid
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“From childhood the Greek is conditioned in church and school to believe that 
in the fullness of time Greek-speaking areas must be united within the 
frontiers of the Motherland. Greeks outside the narrow circles of the most 
intellectually sophisticated still day-dream of the return of Constantinople and 
the lost lands of Anatolia and recall the Treaty of Sèvres with nostalgia.
Forced upon a weak and demoralised Turkey in 1920, this agreement provided 
for territorial changes which brought closer the realisation of ‘the Great Idea’
{Megali Idea)". (my italics)
Within the context of Cyprus, a direct sequence of the widespread currency of the 
Megali Idea was the demand of the island’s union with Greece. The notion of enosis 
would have a critical significance for Cyprus. However, before endeavoring further 
into the matter it is appropriate to elaborate on the notion of enosis.
2.2. The Micro Level
2.2.1. Enosis
Enosis was a direct end product of the notion of the Megali Idea and was thus an 
irredentist undertaking. It was an ideology that challenged the current status quo, at, the 
expense first of the British and then the Turkish side in the Cyprus equation. The 
philosophicaT background and the source of Greek Cypriot attraction to it is worth 
examination. Loizos (1970) qualified some of that background. He argued that “to call 
for union with Greece meant to claim membership in a larger political unit, a nation, 
which had only recently and gloriously fought its way (with European help) to 
freedom from the very same Ottoman rule which had dominated Cyprus...For Greek 
Cypriots to have stood alone would have been to stand politically and culturally
Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978) p. 18
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defenceless; to assert identity with the Greek nation was to invoke a compelling and 
attractive defence”.^ ^
Enosis also signifies a turning point in the history of Greek Cypriot politics. When the 
idea of enosis asserted itself among the Greek Cypriot intelligentsia it also meant that 
the Greek Cypriots' inspiration of political ideology derived from outside the island - 
Greece. From now on, the politics of enosis would he played out conjointly by Greece 
and the Greek Cypriots.
A profoundly nationaUst Greek education was the primary medium that ensured the 
penetration of the enosist ideology among Greek Cypriots. “From the very beginning 
“Greek education in Cyprus followed faithfully the organisation and curricula of the 
education system in Greece, which concentrated heavily on Greek literature, historical 
and cultural tradition, and the Orthodox religion. This education has had a formative 
influence on the kind of language with which Greek Cypriots came later to express
o n
their political ideas and discuss the situation on the island”. Naturally, the 
consequence was a progression toward the demand for enosis and only enosis.
The power struggle between Makarios and the БОКА leadership, the prevalent 
nationalist fanaticism among Greek Cypriots elevated enosis into an unchallengeable 
ideology. Greek Cypriot politicians frequently spoke in terms of enosis and expressing 
loyalty to this ideology was almost a precondition for poHtical acceptance among 
Greek Cypriots. Stavrinides’.. (1976) following statement reflects the extent of the 
impact of the ideology in Cyprus; “to be a Greek, aware of one’s Greekness, and not to
Peter Loizos quoted in Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict (Place of printing and printing house not
specified, 1976) pp. 20-21 
”  Ibid, p. 21
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support the union of Cyprus with the free Greek state, is more than just paradoxical; it 
is an impossibility. A ‘true’ Greek of Cyprus is, by definition, a supporter of enosis
The strength of enosis died after the Turkish intervention of 1974. This is largely due 
to some Greek Cypriot realization that what happened in Cyprus was largely due to the 
zeal and fanaticism with which they have enveloped themselves for the sake of enosis. 
Also, a relatively realistic self-criticism process started in the aftermath of the Turkish 
intervention which by and large de-legitimized enosis. That said, this does not mean 
that enosis is dead, instead it has lost its previous dominant position among Greek 
Cypriots.
2.2.2. Inability to Come to Grips With Reality
There is ample evidence about a Greek/Greek-Cypriot tendency to live in a self- 
constructed political environment. Astonishingly, this uniquely Greek environment has 
created its own parameters, terminology and peculiarly self-explanatory problématique 
in the context of Cyprus. Almost ‘surreal”, such a state of mind makes itself most felt 
when the question of political responsibility for what happened in Cyprus comes to the 
fore. As Reddaway (1986) argued; “when nemesis strikes, it is human nature to look 
for others to blame”...this reaction may have been deliberately fostered by Greek 
Cypriot leaders shaken by the lamentable consequences of the course they themselves 
had chosen and intent on exonerating by finding others on whom they could put the 
blame”.^  ^This characteristic of Greek Cypriot self-perception, undoubtedly related to
^  Ibid, p. 22
John Reddaway, Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection (London: K. Rüstern & Bro. and Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson Ltd.j 1986) p. 90
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the nature of its mother state’s view of the political world surrounding it, is not 
conducive for a clear assessment of the Cyprus prohlem.^^ As Slderos attests;
“a direct result of this personality make-up [surreal, detached from political 
realities] is a frightful mistrust and suspicion that pervades our people, that is 
to say, we suspect any acts of others as being motivated solely by the desire 
for gain and we cannot conceive of the fact that an act can be motivated by 
unselfish and higher human ethical forces”?^
In addition, “the conviction of blamelessness that lies behind everyday life is 
conducive also to other, far more damaging aspects of Greek life and politics - 
particularly the characteristic search for scapegoats and the passionate addiction to 
conspiratorial interpretation of events”?* A Greek intellectual, George Skleros, 
engaged in revealing self-criticism - a rare novelty in Greek politics - in rather blunt 
fashion:
“To this day, our people have been wallowing in a vast sea of subjectivity and 
a form of self-deceit which leaves no room for self-criticism and precludes 
any straightforward self-evaluation. This compels them to overlook reality, to 
give exaggerated explanations of the most simple and human events, and to 
become swamped by an endless flow of pompous self-flattery about their 
ancient heritage and their so-called incomparable attributes...”.^ ’
The actors of this ‘surreal’ political world generally acted almost as if they were keen
to confirm that they were ‘detached firom political realities in the region."^ ® Naturally,
Similar traits have been observed in the Russian Federation, Serbia and other Orthodox societies which have 
difficulties in adapting to post-Cold War conditions. The irony with Greece and Southern Cyprus is that unlike 
other Orthodox states whose economies and political systems have experienced significant upheavals, Greece is a 
member of the EU and Southern Cyprus is economically sound. Yet, the self-perception of being alone and almost 
excluded from the wider world is prevalent among Greeks. For a revealing and recent article on this issue see P.D. 
Spyropoulos, “Anti-Hellenic Disinformation: One of Hellenism’s Greatest Challenges Onto The 21 st Century” 
Greek America March 1999 
”  Holden (1972) p. 98 
Ibid, p. 95
George Skleros cited in David Holden,. Greece Without Columns (1972) p. 98
For a more detailed analysis about such “obsessive attitudes” see Volkan & Itzkowitz’s (1994) chapter titled 
Symptoms of Obsession” pp. 165-175
/
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such conditions brought about severe political and moral losses. The distinct distrust 
felt toward the Greek body politique is thus not in vain."^ * Greek Cypriots hardly trust 
those who have governed and still govern them. Following this line of thought, 
Reddaway (1986) illustrated the prevalent mood of the 1980s; “it may also be that tiie 
vicissitudes of their history have implanted in the Greek Cypriot character a propensity 
to think ill of the motives of those governing them. Even now that they are their own 
masters, this is still a marked feature of Greek Cypriot politics”
2.23. Turkish Interveiition: The Calamity
Greek Cypriots regard the Turkish Intervention of 1974 as the greatest calamity that 
has befallen Cyprus. They genuinely view it as a clear and present expression of 
Tmkish Expansionism long harbored among Turks. Regardless of crucially important 
events preceding the intervention they choose to focus on perpetuating explanations 
which draw as far back as 1 4 5 3 .Accordingly, Turks who have burning Pan-Turkic 
desires and are eager to expand further westward have found an opportunity by the 
fatalistic Sampson coup of July 1974. Even soon after the intervention, Greek Cypriots 
persisted iu ignoring Turkish Cypriot security concerns, Turkish mainland security 
considerations or the credible possibility for the Sampson regime to declare enosis. 
Also, the presence of Turkish military forces injects genuine fear iuto them and it is 
widely believed that the Turks are waiting for a pretext to overtake the whole of the 
island. Interestingly, Greek Cypriots felt alone after Greek mainland meddling in the
Holden (1972) contends ’’that Greeks make good servants but poor masters is an old saying, and some might 
think a harsh one; but it is amply justified by the record, both ancient and modem, for it is hard to think of another 
people whose leaders have been quite so regularly and speedily unbalanced by the feel of power”.
Reddaway (1986) p. 93
The similarity among Orthodox Christian ways of thinking is striking in this regard. Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic’s arguments for a Kosovo within Yugoslavia are based upon the 1389 War of Kosovo between the 
Ottoman Empire and Serbia. The inner workings and contradictory self-explanations of Orthodox Christian political 
thought in contemporary times are certainly worth more scholarly research.
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form of the Sampson coup against Makarios but “also because of the subsequent 
failure of Greece to defend the island when Turkey intervened militarily”."^
The massive refugee problem which forced thousands to move to the South created an 
immense problem for the Greek Cypriots. Associated with the upheaval was a climate 
of fear, a sense of hurt and of being the victim of an injustice on the part of the Greek 
Cypriots.'^  ^ Most importantly a “claustrophobic fear of Turkey which they saw as 
threatening not only their independent collective existence, but also their individual 
persons” was clearly associated with the initial shock."^ ^
Despite their humiliating experiences and accompanying misery Greek Cypriots 
largely maintain their pre-1974 stance on the Cyprus issue. They continue to view the 
politics of Cyprus in terms of intercommunal relations which reflect a majority- 
minority relationship. Yet, open calls for enosis have been dropped, and properly 
defined and fully protected minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots have been 
acknowledged.
2.2.4. Current Features
Further to the above elaborated general traits both inherent in mainland Greek and 
Greek Cypriot self-perceptions and perceptions of the Turks are the following current 
features which have been built upon earlier experiences and should be viewed with 
reference to them.
^  C.H. Dodd, The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus (London: The Eothen 
Press, 1993) pp. 19-20 
Ibid, p. 21 
Ibid
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1. The self-perception of being the victimized party in the Greece vs. Turkey equation 
earlier explained with the defeat at Malazgirt, the fall of Constantinople and the 
Turkokratia era has been iliriher developed and fed by the “Anatolian Disaster” and 
the “1974 Turkish Invasion”.^ ^
2. The linear continuation of perceived victimization and the inability to mourn and 
come to terms with the losses in question legitimizes recourse to irrational foreign 
policy behavior (ie. my enemy’s enemy is my Mend mentality)."^^
3. The Greek Cypriots have dropped official enosist ideals and maintain relative 
independence firom mainland Greece but this does not mean that they act totally 
independent. The Athens-Nicosia partnership views new sort of arrangements such as 
membership to the EU as best available alternatives to enosis.
4. Similar to mainland Greek perceptions of Turkey, Greek Cypriots harbor the belief 
that Turkey and thus the Turkish Cypriots will eventually collapse due to domestic 
problems such as the Kurdish problem, the secular vs. political Islam rivalry, rapid 
population growths and inflation or economic embargo on the TRNC for that matter. 
Or else, even if  a collapse will not occur, as long as Turkey did not enter the EU, it 
would become a weaker country which might present Greece and Southern Cyprus 
with opportunities to recover firom some of the losses.
For an interesting and refreshing article about the contradiction in the Greek self-perception of being the 
victimized party see Norman Stone, “As Divided Cyprus gets ready to welcome America’s top peace broker, 
Turkey sends out a message. Forget the gifts: beware the Greeks, period” The Observer 26 April 1999 where he 
argues that “the Greeks complain of Turkish aggression but it is they who, three times in the past century, attacked 
Turkey”.
Daniel Pipes summarised this point; “the Greeks hate and fear the Turks. And so, in the time-honoured fashion 
of the Middle East, they seek to befiiend other enemies of Turkey, whoever they may be and however vicious they 
may be”. Daniel Pipes, “The Real Middle East” Commentary November 1998 Vol. 106 No. 5 p. 26. Paul Henze 
argues that “Greek-Turkish enmity is neither as immutable nor as deeply anchored in history as Greek-Turkish
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5. Greek Cypriots view political developments in Cyprus as a direct outcome of an 
inherent drive - Greeks define as Turkish Expansionism'. This, is argued, in line with 
latent Pan-Turkic ideals and beliefs that if the opportunity will arise Turkey will 
eventually annex the island. Turkey is viewed then as a direct threat which has to be 
countered at all cost."^ ^
6. Political discourse on a solution to the Cyprus problem continues to maintain the 
basic tenets that led to the conflict in the first place. The Greek Cypriots continue to 
perceive themselves as a majority that is rightful in asserting itself, that any political 
solution should reflect this vision (ie. one citizenship, strong central authority in a 
federation with minimal minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots) and that Cyprus was 
and essentially is a Greek island.
political rhetoric and newspaper hyperbole might lead us to believe”. Paul B. Henze, “Out of Kilter-Greeks, Turks 
& US Policy” The National Interest Summer 1987 p. 75 
For an insightful analysis on the notion of “Turkish Expansionism” see Yiannis Papadakis, “Enosis and Turkish 
Expansionism” in Vangelis Calothycos (ed) Cyprus And Its People (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1998) pp. 69- 
84
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23. THE TURKS
The Macro Picture
Galloping from the Far East 
Reaching out to the Mediterranean 
like a mare’s head 
This country... is ours
[Nazim Hikmet, 1947]
13.1. Turks in EQstory and the Ottoman Turks: Suppression of Identity
The Turks originally were a nomadic people venturing from one dried-up waterhole to 
another in the vastness of Central Asia. They have accomplished a long drive to the
West and have founded several successive states throughout this process 50
It was hot rmtil the tenth century that Islam penetrated Central Asia and the conversion 
of the Turks to Islam began. The drive to the West continued in the eleventh century 
under the Selçuk Turks, an obscure Turcoman horde which set up an empire in Iran. 
But the Selçuk Turks were not content with controlling only their piece of the 
disintegrating Arab empire; recent converts to Islam, they saw themselves as rightful 
heirs to the lands conquered during and immediately after the time of the Prophet 
Muhammet, in particularly, the heretical lands of the Levant and Egypt.^  ^But however 
sedentary and acculturated the Selçuk chieftains had become, the situation on the 
borderlands between the Selçuks and the Byzantines was anything but peaceful. It was 
not until 1071 when the situation reached a critical point and Byzantine emperor 
Romanus IV, decided to pre-empt the nascent Selçuk power on their eastern frontier.
Suat Kiniklioglu, Turco-Russian Relations After the Disintegration of the Soviet Union (unpublished 
Honours Thesis; Carleton University, 1994)
Gary Leiser, A History of the Seljuks (Carbondale IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1988) pp. 91-92
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The Selçuk Turks defeated the Byzantines at Malazgirt and entered Anatolia, a 
milestone in the Turks' overall drive toward the West. The Selçuk Turks set up a viable 
state in Central Anatolia hut succumbed to the devastating Mongol invasion in the 13 
th century. Subsequent to the dispersion of the Selçuk Turks, a new phase in the 
history of the Turks began with the Ottoman Turks, Similar to the Selçuk Turkish 
victory at Malazgirt four centuries ago, the Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople 
in 1453 and brought an end to an era in history.
By the time of the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks had become more 
settled and Islam had made significant inroads in Anatolia.^^ Also, after their entry to 
Anatolia, the Turks had intermingled with the local populations of Asia Minor (ie. 
Hittites, Greeks and Lykians). The Turks practised exogamy which is marrying outside 
one's tribe. They established blood ties with neighboring tribes, which won them allies 
and partially accounts for the confusion surrounding the differences between Anatolian 
Turks and Turkic peoples of Central Asia.
The Ottoman Empire was the last empire of the Turks, (although it was not exclusively 
Turkish) yet, it is the starting point of analysis for the purpose of this thesis. Firstly, it 
must be underlined that ethnically speaking the Turks were Ottomans but the 
Ottomans were not made up of Turks only. The Turks underwent a suppression of 
identity during the Ottoman period. The Ottoman Empire was a truly multi-ethnic 
empire where Ottomanism rather than Turkism was dominant. Although, at one time, 
Turks fiamished the bulk of the ruling classes, they were actually only one of the
Some historians claim that Osman's tribe was not Muslim at the time of the establishment of the empire. 
However, most Turkish historians refute this argument.
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various ethnicities within the vast confines of that multi-ethnic empire."^  ^The dominant 
language in the Ottoman Empire was Ottoman, a peculiar amalgam of Persian, Arabic 
and Turkish where literature was dominated by the Persian language, while Turkish 
was almost relegated to an oral language in Anatolia.^ "  ^ Ottoman sultans did not 
consider to be as Turks but saw themselves as Ottomans. As a matter of fact, the very 
word "Tmk" was firequently used pejoratively and tended to denote a rude peasant or 
an Asiatic Turk.^ ^ Seen firom this perspective, Atatiirk's removal of governmental 
power firom Istanbul which was still overshadowed by the memories of the sultanate 
and in many respects un-Turkish and cosmopolitan - a city where national minorities 
(predominantly Greeks, Armenians and Jews) and nondescript Levantines, many of 
them alien subjects, dominated trade, industry, and the intellectual life, was a reaction 
to this fact.^  ^ He brought the capital to the-then sleepy and dusty town of Ankara, 
located in the heart of Anatolia, which became the ultimate symbol of the Turkish 
Republic.
2.3.2. The Ottoman Experience
The Ottoman system of state and society, often designated as the millet-system {millet: 
nation, community), categorized the various communities according to their religious 
denominations. The Ottomans followed the Islamic practice of tolerance toward 
Christians and Jews because the Koran required Muslims to respect these two non- 
Muslim monotheist religions. The various religious millets among the subject peoples
Oral Sander, "Turkish Foreign Policy; Forces of Continuity and of Change" (ed.) Ahmet Evin, Modem Turkey 
(Opladen, Germany: Leske Verlag & Budrich GmbH, 1984) p.l 16
^  Ordinary Turks cx)uld not comprehend Ottoman literature, which was constructed in complex and often overtly 
stylistic Persian and Arabic syntax. Atatûrk's language reform after the foundation of the republic brought about the 
intensive removal of words of Persian and Arabic origin, indicating the extent of alienation of the written language 
from the masses in Anatolia.
Graham Fuller, Turkey Faces East (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 1992) p.lO. Bozkurt Güvenç (1993) 
notes in his Türk Kimliği (Turkish Identity) that the Turks were labelled with the Arabic proverb Etrak-i bi-idrak 
(Turks cannot comprehend) as a people that cannot comprehend.
Vali Ferenc, Bridge Across the Bosporus (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) p. 45
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suffered little interference, being left under the supervision of their religious leaders, 
who were responsible for their good behavior, the settling of their disputes, and the 
collection of their taxes/^ Throughout most of the Ottoman era, he Turks formed no 
specific perceptions about the Millet-i Rum, the Community of Greeks, because the 
Greeks merely constituted one segment of the Orthodox Christian millet. In time, 
Greeks assumed a more privileged role as commerce was largely in their hands and 
their eminence in foreign languages made the Ottomans largely dependent upon 
Greeks in their dealings with the European Powers. For instance, the Fener Rumlan 
(Phanaroite Greeks) enjoyed a very privileged and influential status for centuries in the 
Empire.
In the modem sense, the Turks formed a perception about the Greeks with the 
Anatolian Campaign in 1919-22. As a result of this campaign the Turks realized to 
what extent the Greeks could become a threat to the very existence of the Turkish 
heartland.
Interestingly, the Turkish Republic never carried irredentist ideals toward modem 
Greece, as the Turkish Republic's very foundation was a political development in 
complete reaction to the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Republican Turkey did not aim 
to re-claim the territories, which Greece took away from the Ottoman Empire as the 
republican project was not about re-constituting the Ottoman Empire, but about 
making a clear cut with the past. Therefore, prior to the Anatolian Campaign, the 
founders of the Republic did not have any prejudice against the Greeks. The rapture 
occurred when Greece decided to invade Turkey in 1919 with the assistance of the
Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey (New York; Praeger Publishing, 1974) p. 34
57
victorious European Powers. The atrocities committed by the invadmg Greek forces, 
the immense human and material losses incurred, lead to the formation of very distinct, 
emotional and enduring perceptions about the Greeks. These perceptions were often 
formed as the result of direct contact and first-hand experiences with the invadmg
Greek armies.
2 3 3 .  Greek Treachery and the Sevres Syndrome
lE Turkish eyes the Greeks were the tost millet that betrayed the Ottoman Empire. 
Many Greeks had served the Ottoman Empire while rising to the most promment 
positions within the Ottoman bureaucracy. Yet they were the first ethnic group which 
started an uprising in the Balkans and set an example to the Serbs. Bulgarians, 
Romanians and Albanians. PapadaMs (1998) describes the Turkish view on the Greek
War of Independence:
“la  the liberal millet system of the glorious Ottoman Empire it was the 
treacherous Greeks who, despite their privileged position, stabbed us m the 
back by first revolting against us, graduaUy capturing more and more
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territories, to attack even the heart of Anatolia in 1922 .
The Greeks were the ethnic group which opened the Pandora Box of the multinational 
Ottoman Empire and bring about its final disintegration. Seen firom this perspective, 
Turks view the Greek War of Independence as a deceitful ‘stab in the back’. Also, the 
circumstances surrounding the Greek success, namely the outside support they 
received from the European Powers adds to Turkish bitterness.^ ® Turkish images of the
58 Papadakis in Calothycos (1998) p. 70. This view was developed once upheaval of W I  and 
Independence War was over. It does not contradict with the earlier argument that the b r ^  came with 
S S i ^ e T ™ h  notion o f  Greek treachery- largely reflects a looking back to history and comprehension of
res^Uhe O ttom L. I n d ^  even with the support of the European Powers it has been very difficult Whenever the
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Greeks reflect this past resentment. Subsequent to this interpretation of the Greek War 
of Independence Turks consider Greeks as untrustworthy and accuse them of bearing 
an ancient enmity toward the Turks and thus are seen as liable to hit Turkey at any 
moment of weakness.^ ®
The next milestone in the perceptional flow of Turco-Greek interaction was the 
Anatolian Campaign of Greece in 1919-22. This campaign was organised as a prelude 
to the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. According to the Treaty, which basically carved up the 
Ottoman Empire into pieces, the Greeks were given the administration of Izmir and its 
hinterland. The British, French and Italians were to carve up the remaining parts. The 
Greeks set afoot Izmir on 15 May 1919 but this event created such outrage among the 
Turks that it turned into the genesis of tiie Turkish War of Independence. For the Turks 
the Anatolian Campaign of 1919-22 was not only the zenith of the Meğali Idea but 
also a degrading step in the implementation of a death sentence issued at Sèvres. Emre 
Kongar provides useful insight to the Turkish perception of the Treaty of Sèvres which 
made the Greek Campaign possible;
“When, the Ottomans were just about to be exterminated...when history was 
just about to finish off the Ottomans, Atatürk and the Turkish people turned 
around the course of history. What would have been normal was Sèvres...How 
did we get from the dependent Konya republic [referring to a land-locked 
small Central Anatolian territory, which was to be left to the Turks by the 
invading Europeans] to independent Turkey? [The Treaty of] Lausanne
Greeks confronted the Turks they always sought the help of others or have invested their hopes in some form or 
other outside intervention. When the Turks besieged Constantinople they waited for help from Naples, Genoa and 
even from the Pope. “During the years of TurL·kratîa they believed in the legend of the xanthon genos^ namely the 
prophecy that a fair-haired people from the north would liberate them”. Clogg (1992) p. 17. Greek independence 
would not have been possible without the active support of Britain, France and Russia. Greeks invaded Asia Minor 
with the encouragement of Britain and other European states. In the 1950s to the 1960s they waited for the help of 
Britain and wanted Cyprus to be ceded to them. In 1974 they waited until the last minute that either the US or the 
Soviet Union would intervene on behalf of them. As the GCA applied to the European Union they are counting on 
the help of Brussels in the Greek Cypriot quest for frill membership.
Tözün Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990) p. 1
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signifies a turn around in history. There the job was done. Lausanne, which 
was anomalous, turned history arormd”.^ * (my emphasis)
Despite the eventual defeat of the Greeks and the victory of the Turkish nationalists, 
the Anatolian Campaign generates some painful memories in the Turkish psyche. This 
pain does not only derive firom the many atrocities perpetrated by the Greek army. 
What needs to be put in perspective are the extraordinary hardships that had to be 
endured for a people that was war-weary and m total material and moral destitution in 
1919. Defeating the Greeks had a great toll and meant iacredible sacrifice which has 
not been forgotten.
As a result, the tenn Sèvres or the so-called “Sèvres syndrome” has acquired a unique 
place in Turkish political culture. It denotes a genuine Turkish fear of disintegration 
associated with painful memories and deep anxiety which was inherited from the 
tormenting experience of the last century of the Ottoman Empire. The accomplishment 
of the long and difficult path from Sèvres to Lausanne meant on one hand the death 
knell to the Megali Idea and what the Greeks label the “Anatolian Disaster”. On the 
other hand, it reminds Turks what great sacrifices had to be made so that Sèvres and 
possible submission to the Greeks was averted. How close the Greeks came to capture 
İzmir and Aegean Turkey from the Turks and thus relegate Turkey - albeit with the 
help of European Powers - to a small and land-locked “dependent Konya Republic” is 
still preserved in Turkish historical consciousness.^^ The Turks can only come to terms
Emre Kongar in Ceviz Kabuğu Kanal 6, 31 October 199861
Attesting to Greek atrocities in the Anatolian Campaign, Norman Stone quotes the Duke of Ellington: “He 
[Ellington] did not think that anyone, let alone Greeks, could behave in the way his men had done”.
It must be noted that Turkish self-perceptions in relation to the post-Sèvres period does not correspond with fear 
or anxiety from the Greeks. Instead it can be described as a feeling of betrayal by the "treacherous Greeks" who 
were supported by the motivation of European revanchism.
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with the Anatolian. Campaign by their emphasis on the War of Independence and the 
subsequent decisive defeat of the invading Greeks in 1922.
2.4. The Micro Level
2.4.1. Turks in Cyprus
Turkish Cypriots are direct descendants of the migration/settlement following the 
conquest of Cyprus. They were drawn from Central and Southern Anatolia and 
primarily settled on land which was confiscated from the Latins. They were engaged in 
farming and until the 1974 intervention were scattered throughout the island.^ Also, 
some former Christians who converted to Islam as well as Ottoman soldiers and 
administrators stayed on. Until early 20th century, Turkish Cypriots first and foremost 
perceived themselves as Muslims. In line with the Ottoman millet system they were 
Muslims but part and representatives of the ruling group in the Empire. As Crawshaw 
(1978) explained;
"Turkish Cypriots provide the second element of continuity in the history of 
Cyprus. Unlike the Greek Cypriots, they were never subjected to foreign mle, 
except for a brief period of British administration initially by consent of their 
own Sultan. This essential difference in historical experience has been a 
significant factor in determining pohtical attitudes".®^
Turkish Cypriots while living side by side with Greek Cypriots generally opted for 
'voluntary segregation'. Mixed villages and cities had their respective ethnic quarters. 
Inter-ethnic problems were rare. By and large, Turks and Greeks lived in peace for 
more than three hundred years. This harmonious period was primarily due to the fact
^  Crawshaw (1978) p. 21 
“ ibid
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that Turks, although smaller in numbers belonged to the ruling group while the Greeks 
were the subject people.^ ^ Until the Greek War of Independence, Turkish Cypriots 
were neither occupied with the future of the island, nor with the nature of their 
relations with Greek Cypriots. The Greek War of Independence marked the turning 
point in the history of the island and thus sparked a change in both side's self­
perceptions as well as their mutual perceptions.
2.4.2. The Rise of Greek Nationalism: Evolution toward Separateness
The rise of nationalism in Europe, and the subsequent events which led to the Greek 
War of Independence at the expense of the Ottoman Turks inevitably changed the 
situation on the island. Turkish administrators became suspicious about the Greek 
Cypriot ethnarchy's activities and adopted a highly sensitive attitude toward signs of 
solidarity with the Greek Independence War. They were constantly plagued by their 
belief that Greek Cypriots were aiding the war in Greece in 1821. The Megali Idea 
and calls for enosis became more pronounced among the Greek Cypriots as news of 
the successes of the Greek War of Independence reached the island. An independent 
and free Greece would offer a new form of existence, both materially and morally for 
the Greek Cypriots. "Alarmed at the power of the Church", Turkish patience wore out 
and in what is described as a public punishment the Turks executed prominent Greek 
figures, including the Archbishop in 1821 ^
®Ubidp.20
There are conflicting historical accounts on this matter. While some sources admit that Greek Cypriots provided 
substantial aid to the Greek War of Independence, others argue that the support was minimal in nature and did not 
justify Turkish reactions.
Crawshaw (1978) p. 21. For a tragic interpretation of this event see John Koumoulides, Cyprus & the War of 
Greek Independence 1821 - 1829 (London: Billing & Sons Ltd., 1974)
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This event could be labelled as the beginning of a "slow but progressive deterioration" 
of inter-ethnic relations in Cyprus.®  ^ Interestingly, the Turkish Cypriots, as was the 
crumbling Ottoman Empire, were on the defensive against the development of 
minority nationalisms in the Empire. Their self-perception as the ruling group 
continued, despite the fact that the ethnarchy was almost running the island on its own.
Turkish Cypriots remained sceptical about periodic calls fort enosis but inter-ethnic 
relations largely remained cordial. The change of sovereignty in 1878 and increasing 
demands for enosis were observed by the Turks from an ‘outsider’ perspective as the 
political discourse on this matter took place between the Greeks and the British. The 
gradually developing opposition to Greek calls for union with Greece intensified in 
accordance with the growing intensity of the enosis movement.
2.4.3. Changing Allegiances and Redefinition of Identity
“Until affected by the modem maioland nationalisms, most of the islanders were prone 
to think, of themselves in smaller scale and more local identifications, äs members of 
families, of villages, as Christians and Muslims, but not until quite recently as modem 
Greeks and modem Turks,, members of ethnic categories grounded in Athens and
Ankara’ 70
From a Turkish viewpoint, the inner workings of this process have to be explained. 
Simultaneous with the Turkish War of Independence and the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923, a rivalry and subsequent dichotomy between secularists and 
Ottomanists occurred. This schism also surfaced among the Turkish elite in Cypms.
69 Ibid, p. 21
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The modernist, nationalist and staunchly secular ideology of mainlanrl Turkey 
inevitably penetrated the Tmrkish Cypriot elite. As a consequence, the island's Turks 
experienced a gradual, albeit slow change of self-perception from member of the 
Ottoman millet to the new republican Turk. Republican Turkish ideology, preoccupied 
with intense nation-building efforts, preached an xmprecedented emphasis and 
awareness of Turkish ethnicity. Pride in Turkishness, fovmd expression in slogans 
such as "Happy is he who calls himself a Truk". It meant a radical break from the past 
and religious-conservative elements on the island had great difficulty in bodi digesting 
and adjusting to this change. But similar to their fate in mainland Turkey, religious- 
conservative elements had to succumb to the modernist republican wave.
In time, Turkish Cypriots' self-perception underwent a successfril transition from 
ruling group Muslim and member of an Ottoman millet, to secular republican Turk.^ ^
2.4.4. Turkish Cypriot Construction of Reactionary Nationalism
From 1931 to the early 1950s inter-ethnic relations remained within acceptable limits 
as Greek Cypriot demands for enosis primarily targeted the British and chose to ignore 
the Turkish factor. The poles in the conflict appeared to be Greek Cypriots against the 
British administration. The Greeks chose to ignore the Turkish factor while the British 
encouraged a larger role for the Turks in order to counter the Greek drive for enosis. 
As far as mainland Turkey was concerned, Reddaway (1986) argues diat "for most of 
the period of British rule it suited Turkey to lie low and leave it to Britain, as the ruling
™ Peter Loizos, “How Might Turkish and Greek Cypriots See Each Other More Clearly?” in Vangelis Calotychos, 
Cyprus and Its People (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) p* 44
The republicans* notion of Turkishness was not grounded in racial terms. Turkishness was based on “feeling 
Turkish’* and expressing it
Obviously, this process had its complications and difficulties. Particularly religious-conservative elements of the 
old order such as the Muftu resisted the change and favored the preservation of the old order but the scope of this 
paper does not permit for a detailed account of this process.
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power, to deal with enosis. It was only when violence broke out and there seemed to 
be a risk that Britain might yield to it, that Turkey began taking an active hand in the 
Cyprus problem.^ ^
The growing agitation between Greek Cypriots and the British administration 
precipitated a British distrust for Greek Cypriots hi the administration of Cyprus. 
Hence, Turkish Cypriots assumed a greater role in the colonial police force and the 
bureaucracy. Thus, the interest of Turkish Cypriots in security and political equality 
made them natural allies of the English in their struggle for the defence of the 
previously existing public order.
The Turkish Cypriots regarded the continued efforts of the Greek-Orthodox Church 
and die Greek Cypriots to turn Cyprus into a Greek island as provocative and 
detrimental to their legitimate rights because all Turkish Cypriots believed what was
‘freedom’ for the Greek Cypriots wa§ ‘enslavement’ for the Turkish Cypriots. E n o s i s
simply meant neo-colonization and forced exodus from Cyprus.76
As a result, the Turkish Cypriots developed a distinct sense of reaction to any form of 
Greek Cypriot expression for enosis. "Even the smallest move in favor of enosis was 
guaranteed to provoke reaction on the part of the Turkish Cypriots. Hill's History
’^Reddaway(1986)p. 18
Christian Heinze, Cyprus Conflict (London: K. Rüstem & Brother : 1986) p. 29 
Necati Mûnir Ertekûn, The Cyprus Dispute (Oxford, UK: Rüstem & Brother, 1984) p. 2 
Ibid. Ertekûn (1984) argues that “it was this clash of divergent beliefs and opposing national aspirations and 
policies which was the root cause of the Cyprus problem and the intercommunal strife between the Turkish Cypriots 
and Greek Cypriots. Stavrinides (1976) also argues in the same vein: “Turkish nationalism, in its separatist form, 
developed as a reaction to Greek demands for the union of the whole Cyprus with Greece”.
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records no less than twenty examples between 1882 and 1931 of counter-agitation by 
the Turks”/ ’
There is no doubt today that the existence of Greek Cypriot nationalism, which, at the 
time, was relatively more mature, developed and dynamic in nature greatly contributed 
to the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. Turkish Cypriot nationalism 
originated by the primordial response to enosis in the form of a commrmal reflex 
which was responsible for the building of mental trenches against the drive for enosis.
The development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism was not only due to Turkish Cypriot 
opposition to enosis, but also owed its further development to the growing influence of 
mainland Turkey on the Turkish Cypriot elite.
The British imperial outlook was relaxed toward education. As a result, "most 
secondary schools in Cyprus came under the direct influence, and to some extent 
control, of Greece and Turkey".’* Turkish nationalism, just like its Greek counterpart 
flourished on rival lines. This bi-pattemed education system which preached pride in 
Turkishness, a new interpretation of history and a clear disassociation with the 
Ottoman past increased Turkish national consciousness and awareness of 
'separateness'. Turkish Cypriots, increasingly began to think of themselves as Turks, in
other words, in terms of their “mother state”.79
Crawshaw (1978) p. 24 
Ibid, p. 22
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2.4.5. Fear - Suppression - Humiliation
From the time the EOKA took up arms and started its violent campaign until the 
Turkish intervention of 1974, the lives of Turkish Cypriots transformed into a virtual 
nightmare. It is during this period that Turkish Cypriots’ most distressing perceptions 
about Greek Cypriots were formed. The violence they have been subjected to, the 
inhuman and degrading treatment they have received at the hands of the Greek 
Cypriots left strong scars in their inner consciousness.*® Turkish Cypriots suffered 
humiliating conditions in small, severely insufficient enclaves; their fireedom of 
movement was strictly limited, their houses confiscated or burnt. They were firequently 
hindered to farm their lands, were subjected to discriminatory practices and finally 
became targets of indiscruninate violence. At times they were shot at by Greek Cypriot 
snipers, at times they were directly attacked and their houses demolished. Unwanted 
as they were, at best they were told to leave to other areas. In short, they were the 
primary target for what today’s popular political terminology describes as Greek 
Cypriot “ethnic cleansing”. For them, make-shift refugee camps, migration, loss of 
home, family and rapidly dwindling material means became everyday facts of their
82lives. They became a people simultaneously on retreat and defense.
A learned scholar of the Cyprus issue stated that the essential problem in Cyprus is that 
the Greeks do not remember what happened before 1974 while the Turks only 
remember that period of their existence in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot fear of total
For an interesting analysis of the concept of "mother states and host states in a Balkan context see, Soner 
Çağaptay, Balkan Minorities and their Effect Upon Balkan Security (unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent 
University - Dept, of International Relations, July 1995)
For a detailed account of this period see Rauf Denktaş, Rauf Denktaşhn Hatıraları 1964-1974 Arşiv belgeleri 
ve notlarla o günler” (Rauf Denktaş’s Memories 1964-1964 Archival documents and notes of those days) 
(Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınlan, 1996)
For contemporary news reports and detailed quotations of Turkish persecution in the hands of EOKA bands see 
Michael Stephen, The Cyprus Question (London: British-Northern Cyprus Parliamentary Group, 1997)
For a good observation of some of the Turkish refugees see George Mikes quoted in Stavrinides (1976) pp. 128- 
129
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annihilation and extermination at the hands of fanatical EOKA bands, the humiliating 
treatment and less-than-human form of existence in the enclaves were primary  
elements which shaped the Turkish Cypriot view of themselves and as those 
responsible for it, of thé Greek Cypriots.
All in all, there were two simultaneous trends at work during this time period. Firstly, 
deteriorating physical and moral conditions, which compelled them to live under sub­
human conditions. Secondly, a parallel growth of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, which, 
albeit reactionary, increasingly resonated in mainland Turkey as well.
Turkish Cypriot self-perceptions largely reflect their strong sense of severe 
victimization and anger vis-a-vis this experience. They are keen to emphasize that total 
eradication was only averted by the 1974 intervention of mainland Turkey. It is not 
surprising then that “despite theh overwhelming military superiority, the Turks 
continued long after, the invasion to suffer from the psychosis of a people on the 
defensive: intransigence and an obsession with security”.*^
2.4.6.1974: Intervention and the beginning of a new form of existence
The most obvious reaction to the intervention was long-awaited relief. A deep sense of 
appreciation and gratitude to mainland Turks, personified in the Turkish Armed 
Forces, was a commonly expressed sentiment. As, physical and moral maltreatment 
came to an end and the archenemy was thrown off beyond a “Green Line” they were 
now safe from molestation. Life during the post-intervention era was marked by 
relative safety, freedom of movement and hope for a new form of existence. However,
’ Crawshaw (1978) p* 395
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despite new security conditions and reassurances intervention brought with it, it was 
not easy for Turkish Cypriots to cast off the shadow of past violence. Yet, a marked 
difference from the Greek Cypriot experience was their aspiration and willingness to 
make a new start. Crawshaw (1986) expands on the matter:
“The Turkish Cypriots, like the Greeks, had experienced a major social 
upheaval. The difference was that the Turks accepted the situation as 
permanent and the sacrifices entailed as essential to future peace”.^
Turkish Cypriots felt immeasurably more secure after the 1974 intervention as a 
sizeable Turkish military presence was established on the island. As Dodd (1993) 
argues, to this day, Turkish Cypriots feel “almost wholly dependent upon” Turkish 
military presence as “neither international guarantees, UNFICYP, nor the British 
forces on the island had served to protect them in the past”.®^
The trauma of being uprooted from their former places of inhabitancy could only be 
balanced by their sense of liberation. Their security was now assured and their past 
miseries, came to an end. On the economic front conditions promised to become more 
favourable as post-1974 conditions meant that 37 per cent of Cyprus was now in 
Turkish Cypriot hands’’.*^  Throughout the last decade they were at the receiving end of 
injustice perpetrated by Greek Cypriots. Hence, the mood of fear, upheaval and trauma 
persisted for some time. Most important from a political perspective, Turkish Cypriots 
continued to feel “the denial of their identity as a founding partner in an independent 
Cyprus. Notwithstanding, the many uncertainties entailed, the immense upheaval and *
Ibid
Dodd (1993) pp. 19-20
** Ibid, p. 21
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many other distressing developments, tiie 1974 intervention also injected a most 
needed hope and belief that a better future was attainable.
That said, “as years went by the expansion of the confrontation areas was matched by 
widening psychological barriers; both sides became more entrenched in their attitude 
of mutual hostility and a whole generation was growing up which had never known 
personally any member of the other community”.
2.4.7. Current Features
First and foremost, Txirkish Cypriots do not see themselves as a minority, but as one of 
the island’s two principal communities. This view had been acknowledged during 
British rule as well as at the preparation stages of the establishment of the short-lived 
Cyprus Republic.
Turkish Cypriots reckon they have given international negotiations a fair chance and 
have waited adequately and patiently until 1983. Given the new realities in Cyprus, 
and the desire for a “federated solution” they have shown flexibility and have moved a 
step forward as the then-Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. They were prepared to 
embark on a new relationship provided Turkish Cypriot sensitivities were taken into 
consideration. However, as this has not been materialized and it has not been possible 
to negotiate a new relationship with the Greek Cypriots they have opted to go it alone. 
In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was established. Despite 
the fact that the TRNC has not been recognized by any other state save Turkey, they
*’ Crawshaw(1978) p.383
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are confident that, in time, they will consolidate their state and will be able to forge an 
independent path into the future.
Time has consolidated the gains they have acquired with the 1974 intervention. In 25 
years not only have they developed their own state, but also their own political and 
social culture. Despite the many shortcomings of existence without international 
recognition, they are much more self-confident. They are proud about themselves as 
they have stood up against what they perceive as severe persecution and in defiance of 
a hostile world have achieved to a large extent what they have aimed for.
The Turkish Cypriots despise the international recognition of the Greek Cypriot 
Administration as the only recognized government. On this issue, their perennial sense 
of injustice in the face of the international arena is frequently echoed.
Many of them believe that the Cyprus issue is solved and that living side-by-side with 
the Greeks is no longer in the books. The only accepted formula for co-habitation in 
Cyprus must involve the international recognition of their state and an equal status 
with southern Cyprus. Anything short of that is simply not acceptable. Ultimately, and 
with'the solid support of mainland Turkey, they are willing to take the risk of ignoring 
the South and look only toward the North for inspiration. In other words, they are 
prepared to throw in their lot with an ever-assertive Turkey wherever that may lead in 
the future.
As far as their perceptions about the Greek Cypriots are concerned;
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1. Turkish Cypriots do not trust Greek Cypriots and basically have little inclination, if 
any, to live together with them. In regards to the 1974 intervention, they do carry some 
feeling of guilt Yet, they believe that the 1974 intervention has delivered rough justice 
- something they had been deprived for long.
2. Turkish Cypriots equally believe that they are the victimized party in the conflict. 
They are unwilling to forget Greek Cypriot atrocities during the period of 1964-1974. 
Hence, their primary concern remains preoccupation with security, they argue, can 
only be ensured by the arms of the Turkish military.
3. Greek Cypriot efforts to redress the situation, particularly the EU membership 
application is viewed as new designs in order to facihtate enosis. Essentially, the 
Greek Cypriots are seen as a fanatic people incapable of digesting and comprehending 
new realities in the region (ie. the growing assertiveness and central role of Turkey in 
Eurasia). Due to this perceived fanaticism, Greeks are seen as capable of engagiag in 
all sorts of irrational foreign policy behavior.
4. Despite their pride of accomplishment in the embodiment of the TRNC they envy 
the economic success that have been accomplished in the South. Nevertheless, Turkish 
Cypriots are keen to stress the role and contribution of generous international aid in the 
economic success of the South. In relation to this matter, they reflect a genuine 
frustration with the international community because of the economic embargo levied 
upon them.
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CHAPTER ІП: CONCLUSION
This thesis attempted to provide a relatively impartial accoimt of the history of Cyprus 
although it is acknowledged that perfection is but rarely attained. It also attempted to 
emphasize a number of important features which shaped current self-perceptions and 
perceptions of the “other”. How was “the othef ’ formed hi the mental image of the 
self? How do each sides view “the other” and what sort of impact did it have on 
foreign-policy formulation and foreign policy behavior? What was it that made “the 
other” perceive events in that particular manner?
The history of Cyprus, particularly the developments of the last four decades have 
illustrated that the two sides are still far from comprehending the origins of their 
political arguments and why each side views them as legitimate. Since the Turkish 
Intervention of 1974 there is relative peace on the island and as demonstrated in this 
thesis the two sides’ positions on the future of the island as well as their perceptions 
of what has happened have changed significantly. That said, the main issues, namely 
the issue of the Greek side perceiving itself as an ethnic majority that has a historic 
right to assert itself while offering minimal minority rights to the Turkish Cypriots has 
not changed. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots have not moved from their original 
position which accorded them equal partner and co-founder status of the Cyprus 
Republic and that mere minority rights are unacceptable to them. The Turkish Cypriot 
self-perception as an equal partner is not a mere outcome of the constitutional 
arrangement of the Cyprus Republic but a natural extension of the fact that Cyprus 
was more than 300 years under Ottoman rule and the Turks enjoyed ruling group 
status, albeit in var5nng degrees, throughout this period.
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Greek perceptions about the Turks reveal the difficulty in properly digesting the 
historical fact that the lands of Byzantium, Constantinople and Anatolia are now and 
are going to be in the foreseeable future in Turkish hands. The political psychology 
which is fed by a state of denial due to the inability to complete what has been coined 
a “mourning process” in this thesis is hindering Greeks to assess facts without the 
romantic/ideological baggage that is associated with such a perception. Within the 
framework of Cyprus, Greeks view 1974 as point zero and tend to ignore or downplay 
pre-1974 developments. The Turkish Intervention is viewed as a brutal invasion and 
gross injustice inflicted on them. Accordingly, the perception of a Turkey that is 
seeking to invade Cyprus and Greece due to a supposed policy of Pan-Turkic ideals is 
dominating the Greek outlook. This sort of outright fear is fed by the demographic 
inequality which reflects an ever-assertive Turkey in the region. The Greek political 
consensus which is based on the behef that Greeks were at the receiving end of a 
major historical injustice, an all-encompassing victimization mentality which is 
subsequent to this belief constitutes a major obstacle for rational policy-making when 
dealing with Turkey.
Turkish self-perceptions embody an amalgam of different currents ranging from a 
commanding pride in themselves due to the achievements both of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Turkish Republic to a hysterical insecurity associated with the Sèvres 
Syndrome. In relation to the Greeks, Turks are well aware that the Greeks invaded the 
Txirkish heartland with the aim of driving them away forever. In Cyprus, Greek 
aggression reverberates in the Turkish psyche with the terror campaign of the БОКА 
and the Akritas Plan. Yet, Turks have a shorter memory when it comes to make 
rational foreign-policy decisions and tend to detach themselves from
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romantic/ideological interpretations of history. The perceptions of the Greeks as a 
treacherous people which revolted first among the various ethnic groups and thus 
precipitated the fall of the Ottoman Empire has still currency on the cultural plane. 
The role of the European powers in the establishment of modem Greece, the fact that 
Greece always confronts Turkey with outside support, be in the form of Europe or the 
US merely serves to consolidate Turkish suspicions about a religious-cultural and/or 
civilizational divide which alienated Turks further form the W est
All in all, it has to be recognized that a solution to the Cypms problem is unlikely to 
be found by legal/constitutional safeguards only, although such measures would be 
critical in a future settlement The most significant factor in a rapprochement in 
Cypras will require a fundamental change in tiie two sides’ mutual perceptions. Both 
Turks and Greeks would have to eliminate factors which, feed current modes of 
thought, history education being one of the problems to be addressed urgently. Also, a 
recognition of the origins and development of the self-perceptions of the other side 
would be required. A radical break with the public perception of the other side would 
be an unrealistic target to attain but a gradual change m the political elites’ outlooks 
may be achieved. Obviously, a gradual increase in direct contacts would have to 
accompany such an effort. Such efforts alone would be inadequate. Concrete political 
steps and compromise on real issues which would involve serious give-and-take 
exercises would have to compliment the above mentioned measures. Undoubtedly, 
this would require genuine political will on both sides.
In Cypras, the post-intervention era has b rou^ t about some soul-searching, 
particularly among Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Many Greeks acknowledge that the
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drive for enosis was counterproductive. Yet, as both sides are heavily politicized and 
have increasingly moved toward separateness while forging separate identities 
destined for their own, individual paths, thus realizing the effective partition of 
Cyprus with the two mother states assuming ever-increasing commitments to their 
respective clients, a solution to the Cyprus Problem is not likely to originate 'from' the 
island. The absence of political violence, the rapid economic development of the 
GCA, the international arrangement that lends international recognition to the GCA 
and ostracizes the TRNC, the acceptance of the current status quo as final by the 
Turkish side, are all factors which impede motivation toward a settlement. Hence, it is 
much more likely that a rapprochement between the two mother states would have to 
occur first and a determined international political will for a settlement which would 
be creative enough to rid itself of outdated UN parameters would have to be present.
Cyprus is destined to maintain its strategic importance in the volatile Eastern 
Mediterranean. Whether it will be the starting point of a true and genuine 
rapprochement between Turkey and Greece remains to be seen. What is of less 
uncertainty is that the road to a final settlement in Cyprus and a genuine 
rapprochement in the Aegean is dependent upon the recognition of the significance of 
the mutual perceptions of all actors involved. Only such a recognition would liberate 
all sides from the heavy weight of their perceptional baggage and would help them to 
solve their problems in light of rational parameters and real foreign policy interests.
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